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Boulwarism: Will Labor-Management
Relations Take It or Leave It?

MORRIS D. FORKOSCH*

Has Lemuel R. Boulware's brainchild survived its baptismal decade of union
and judicial immersion? If not judicially rejected, has it been significantly
altered? Unfortunately no illuminating answers appear; the decisions and
opinions are complicated,' and the General Electric Company (GE) takeit-or-leave-it (TILI) 2 insurance plan offer emerges from the judicial cauldron
as somewhat Janus-faced and confused.
Can one treat this pre-bargaining insurance plan as distinct from the
same plan found in the bargaining period, and if so, can one condemn the
latter separately on a per se basis? Can one use either or both TILI
offers as evidence of a general bad faith charge? Or is the specific TILI insurance plan not only to remain so termed but also to be transformed into
a general appellation for an overall series of acts and conduct-Boulwarism
as conceived and practiced by GE?3 The second face of TILI is the bugaboo
* Professor of Law, Chairman of Department of Public Law, Brooklyn Law
School; A.B., 1936, M.A., 1938, J.S.D., 1948, New York University; Ph. D., 1952,
M.S.Sc., 1958, New School for Social Research; LL.B., 1930, LL.M., 1932, St. John's
University; member of the New York bar.
1. The pertinent decisions and opinions are General Elec. Co., 150 N.L.R.B. 192
(1964), af 'd, NLRB v. General Elec. Co., 418 F.2d 736 (2d Cir. 1969) (Kaufman,
J., writing for the majority of two; Waterman, J., concurring; Friendly, J., concurring
and dissenting), cert. denied, 90 S. Ct. 995 (1970). For a summary of the decade-long
proceedings see 418 F.2d at 739-40.
It may be added that in the Court of Appeals, Judge Friendly felt that the judiciary
should on a discretionary basis "decline to enforce a Labor Board order relating to
practices nearly a decade in the past when . . . any harmful effect of the alleged
unfair labor practice has been dissipated...." Id. at 774. Judge Friendly further objected to the "general obscurity" of the Board's order in telling GE what it "is and is
not permitted to do . . . [so that] no contempt proceeding could be successfully maintained," referring to International Longshoremen's Ass'n v. Philadelphia Marine Trade
Ass'n, 389 U.S. 64, 76 (1967). Id. at 773. But see Judge Kaufman's reply on "specific conduct" being now proscribed, infra note 165 and accompanying text.
2. This acronym was coined by this writer in "Take It Or Leave It" as a Bargaining Technique, 3 CALIF. W.L. REV. 43 (1967).
3. These two faces of TILI, as just illustrated, are discussed in NLRB v. General
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of not only the International Union of Electrical Workers, AFL-CIO (IUE)
but of unionism in general; it is this general aspect which eventually becomes the focus of initial judicial condemnation and therefore must be
considered separately from the specific TILI insurance plan.
The conclusion of this writer is that, as of now and sans a clarifying Supreme Court ruling, a good deal, if not all, of Boulwarism's tactics are still
available, albeit to be used cautiously. 4 In support of this conclusion I will
set forth GE's overall plan, technique, and conduct in some detail and analyze them in the light of the related Trial Examiner-National Labor Relations Board (NLRB)-Second Circuit opinions.
"Boulwarism"

"Boulwarism ' 5

is a coined term, analogous in creation to "boycott," and
perhaps initially equally as vague. 7 Its understanding, if not definition, requires a bit of background. For our purposes this background begins with
the 1946 national contract negotiations between GE and the United Electrical Workers (UE). In that year GE's complacency about its employee relations was badly shattered when its proposed ten cent hourly increase was
rejected and a lengthy strike resulted in its agreeing to an 18.5 cent raise.
This debacle for GE resulted in the hiring of Lemuel R. Boulware as the
GE labor relations expert. With Boulware came a new bargaining policy8
embracing a singular basic concept and a program to effectuate it.
Elec. Co., 418 F.2d 736 (2d Cir. 1969). See, e.g., Judge Friendly's criticism that
"the Board correctly declined to affix the 'take-it-or-leave-it' label [on GE's eventual
overall proposal] which my brother Kaufman uses." Id. at 769.
4. See discussion accompanying and following note 159 infra.
5. On its spelling, i.e., with or without an "e" after the "r," see Judge Kaufman's preference for the "e" in NLRB v. General Elec. Co., 418 F.2d 736, 740 n.1
(2d Cir. 1969).
6. This term is derived from Captain Charles Cunningham Boycott, an English
land agent in Mayo, Ireland, whose ruthlessness in the eviction of tenants in 1880
caused his employees to refuse to cooperate with him and his family, i.e., to boycott
them.
7. In Gill Engraving Co. v. Doerr, 214 F. 111, 118 (S.D.N.Y. 1914) the court said
boycott was a word "of vague signification, [with] no accurate and exclusive definition"
available. Since then the term has been further judicially and statutorily defined and
applied. M. FORKOSCH, LABOR LAW § 250 (2d ed. 1965).
8. Professor Northrup disagrees with this writer's statement that with Mr. Boulware
"came a new bargaining policy." In his book Northrup states that
"Boulwarism"-the employee relations policies of the General Electric Company-thus has its roots firmly in company history which occurred long before Lemuel R. Boulware came on the scene, and has been shaped by many
factors indigenous to this company and its managerial personnel.
H. NORTHRUP, BOULWARISM 1 (1964). Both this book and an earlier article by Northrup, The Case for Boulwarism, 41 HARV. Bus. REV., Sept.-Oct. 1963, at 86, offer a
strong defense for the Boulware methods and procedures. Northrup "was closely
connected with G.E.'s program for several years as employee relations consultant."
Id. at 3.
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This basic concept, "marketing," has been described as "the linchpin of
the 'Boulware approach.'-10 The 1946 strike had disclosed to GE that its
side of the issues, as well as its objectives and policies, were not under-

stood by its employees."

To meet this problem, the new vice-president

adapted "from the consumer marketing process" a "job marketing program,"
since "job marketers and product marketers deal with the same people and
the same considerations."' 12 His assumed parallel required, for marketing
job satisfaction to GE's employees, a "high 'single standard' of research,
preparation, value, full information and courageous public forthrightness
1
which had been so rewarding in our relations with our product customers."' 1
The "public forthrightness" and "full information" included the usual public
relations approach previously followed as well as an aggressive campaign
after the bargaining had been concluded so as to inform everyone of the
details. This approach was to continue thereafter between bargainings,
14
during bargainings when necessary, and especially during strike periods.
A new ten-point approach to collective bargaining was now to be effectuated: 15 (1) GE would engage in intensive year-round research into all
"pertinent" facts relevant to its relations with its employees;', (2) Through9. "To Boulware, GE's main shortcoming in employee relations was a failure in
'marketing.'" Northrup, The Case for Boulwarism, 41 HARV. Bus. REV., Sept.-Oct.
1963, at 87.
10. NLRB v. General Elec. Co., 418 F.2d 736, 741 (2d Cir. 1969).
11. The union, it was felt, had stolen a march in publicizing its views, obtaining
employee support, and thereby castigating the company.
The desire of GE to move quickly in adopting a new approach may be explained
in part by the fact that UE was allegedly communist-dominated (it was later ousted
from the CIO). To "permit a union so oriented an unopposed communication
[of issues, etc.] and indoctrination [of "class struggle" terms] track to General Electric
employees must certainly have seemed wrong to a General Electric management
now determined to reset its employee relations course." H. NORTRUP, BOULWARIsM 22
(1964).
12. Id. at 25 (quoting L.R. Boulware).
13. GE's Employee Relations Newsletter, Year-End Review, Dec. 31, 1954, at 5.
14. See, e.g., the Trial Examiner's comment: "All that has been said above is tied to
what clearly appears to be the keystone of Respondent's bargaining philosophy-the
marketing of management positions directly to employees so that the employees in
turn may influence union acceptance." 150 N.L.R.B. at 208.
15. This ten-point program is the writer's condensation. For details and background,
see Northrup, supra note 9, at 86. See also Cooper, Boulwarism and the Duty to Bargain in Good Faith, 20 RuTGERS L. REV. 653 (1966); Duvin, The Duty to Bargain: Law in Search of Policy, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 248, 288-92 (1964); Fanning, The
Duty to Bargain in 1962, 14 LAB. L.J. 18, 19-20 (1963); Gomberg, Government Participation in Union Regulation and Collective Bargaining, 13 LAB. L.J. 941, 945-46
(1962); Gross, Cullen & Hanslowe, Good Faith in Labor Negotiations: Tests and
Remedies, 53 CORNELL L. REV. 1009, 1023 (1968); Boulwarism v. Coalitionism-the
1966 GE Negotiations, 5 MANAGEMENT OF PERSONNEL Q., Summer 1966, at 2; 76
HARV. L. REV. 807 (1963); 63 MIcH. L. REV. 1473 (1965); 61 Nw. U.L. REV. 427
(1966)
16. The trial examiner's report expanded that: "Its research includes not only a
study of business conditions, competitive factors, economic trends, and the like, but
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out the entire period between contracts, the company would inform its
employees of all facts pertinent to their conditions, e.g., wages, company
policies, and other efforts; (3) At the inception of bargaining, and yet still
as part of its overall research pattern, GE would listen to the unions'
presentations and take into account the additional facts 17 supplied; (4)
Assuming both sides had done their homework properly, then they should
both desire voluntarily and willingly to cooperate in having each obtain just
shares; 18 (5) Assuming there were new and pertinent facts, GE would then
evaluate the unions' demands in the light of the totality of the facts now
before it; (6) This evaluation concluded, GE would next make and publicize' 9 its own determination of what it considered to be "right;" (7) This
determination would embrace everything GE found to be warranted and
would be presented to the unions without holding anything back for any
trading or compromisiing (there is as yet no TILI);20 (8) The GE offer
the gathering of its own information as to employee needs and desires through independent employee attitude surveys, comments made by employees at informative meetings, direct discussions by supervisors with employees, and statements in union publications." 150 N.L.R.B. at 208.
17. These union "facts" must be somewhat objective and susceptible to computertype analysis. Of course, the pertaining GE evaluations of business conditions, company objectives and policies, are essentially subjective.
18. On the alleged effect upon employers in general of the second and fourth aspects of this new policy, and because of the Board's view that GE had thereby violated
the National Labor Relations Act, 150 N.L.R.B. at 197-98, see the testimony of Eugene
A. Keeney, labor counsel to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Hearings on Investigation of the Administration of the National Labor Relations Act, as Amended, by
the National Labor Relations Board before the House Comm. on Education and Labor,
89th Cong., 1st Sess. 253-56 (1956). See also note 14 supra.
19. This is in line with its policy of keeping its employees fully informed of all
facts. This "communications" program, which was an important part of the new bargaining procedures, was year-round and intensified in the pre-negotiation and negotiation periods. The Second Circuit majority opinion stated:
The last step [in the new GE plan] was the most important, most innovative,
and most often criticized. GE took its "product"--now a series of fullyformed bargaining proposals-and "sold" it to its employees and the general
public. Through a veritable avalanche of publicity, reaching awesome proportions prior to and during negotiations, GE sought to tell its side of the issues
to its employees.
418 F.2d at 740. In this telling all levels of company personnel are included, and all
forms of communications are used, e.g., circulars, company newspapers, radio and TV,
newspaper advertisements. The employees are kept informed not only of economic
matters and issues but also of GE's views and criticism of union leadership, e.g., its
"feud" with IUE's president James Carey is already part of the bargaining folklore.
See Herman Wilson Lumber Co., 149 N.L.R.B. 673, 675 (1964), where board member Leedom dissented partially because "'[hard bargaining' is not unlawful conduct
under the Act" and because an employer is permitted to inform his employees of any
bargaining disadvantages accruing, so that the "campaign material thus constituted
lawful economic predictions" under the National Labor Relations Act § 8(a), 29
U.S.C. § 158(a) (1964). Id. at 675.
20. In thus seeking, obtaining, evaluating, and subjecting to union criticism and
addition all these facts, a scientifically-oriented, computer-like, objectively fair deter-
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would be subject to adjustment by GE "whenever (but only when) new
information from any source or a significant change in facts indicates that
its initial offer fell short of being right;"'2 1 (9) On the basis of all of the
proceeding, the traditional method of bargaining 22 would not be required,
i.e., the give-and-take compromise need not be used; (10) Assuming no
adjustment would be necessitated by new or changed facts, then as a
matter of company policy, the determination, ultimately presented to all
unions and unrepresented employees, 23 would not be changed. GE would
withstand "a strike of any duration to resist doing what it considers to be
'wrong.'"24

Boulwarism, as so conceived and without more, did not seek to be a rigid
and inflexible disjunctive where an employer's overall proposal is immediately slapped down on a bargaining table at the first session without any "byyour-leave" of the union. As conceived it was not meant to be unilaterally
arrived at and thereafter adhered to regardless of union arguments, facts,
concessions, or desire to discuss. 25 Boulwarism sought to set up a rational
mination should result. This overall procedure and "scientific" orientation superficially
appeared sensible and right; as later seen, however, it was just this aspect which, making unions ultimately unnecessary for bargaining outraged the unions and forced them
into their own TILI demand, namely, no more TILL And, as this writer concludes,
they were successful in this.
21. 150 N.L.R.B. at 208, continuing: "But GE believes-or at least so declaresthat if it has done its preliminary research into the facts accurately, no substantial
reason for changing its offer should ever exist, save in the event of some new unforeseen development having an impact on the economy as a whole." See also H. NORTHRUP, BOULWARIsM 29 (1964).
22. E.g., the union initially presents a preposterously high demand, the company
counters with a preposterously low one, and the parties now higgle, inching forward to
where they finally meet at a compromise figure. GE may still take this method into
consideration.
23. "GE also pursued a policy of guaranteeing uniformity among unions, and between
union and non-union employees. Thus all unions received substantially the same offer,
and unrepresented employees were assured that they would gain nothing through representation that they would not have had in any case." 418 F.2d at 741.
24. 150 N.L.R.B. at 208. The Trial examiner continued:
The Respondent extols its "fair and firm offer" approach as a straightforward
one that removes doubt from employees' minds as to precisely where it stands.
It disparagingly refers to the "ask-and-bid" or "auction" form of bargaining
as a "flea bitten eastern type of cunning and dishonest but pointless haggling." Such bargaining, according to the Respondent's articulation, allows a
union to appear to get more than an employer is willing to give, though that is
often not the case, and this only serves, it says, to mislead employees into
believing that union officials are useful in ways they are not, thus falsely enhancing the union's prestige while diminishing that of the employer and encouraging employee support of union shows of strength. The Respondent's
approach on the other hand, it says, makes it obvious to employees that the
Company "is not being forced to be fair by the belligerent action of a labor
union."
25. Judge Friendly castigated Judge Kaufman for using, but not defining, the phrase
"take-it-or-leave-it," and then "suppose[d] it meant a resolve to adhere to a position
without even listening to and considering the views of the other side." 418 F.2d at 768.
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procedure, albeit patterned upon marketplace merchandising, with a built-in
give-and-take, although not entirely following traditional methods. 26 Externally, and according to these procedures, the company did not enter the
bargaining negotiations with a closed mind-i.e., a take-it-or-leave-it attitude; but after listening to the union's demands, if necessary GE would reevaluate its own position and then place upon the table its complete offer
subject, however, to change if the union presented new facts. Throughout,
GE retained an open mind, seeking an ultimate agreement fair to all
parties. 27 In other words, Boulwarism outwardly sought to meet the union
at a "bargaining table where argument, persuasion, and the free interchange
of views could take place, '2 8 even though its eighth step placed the onus
upon the union to argue and persuade after step six had occurred.
The coin-face disclosed that Boulwarism was, throughout, a one-sided type
of ultimate decision-making, for it would be GE that determined which of its
accumulated facts, or which of those presented by the unions, were pertinent and relevant, how these should be evaluated, what the conclusions
should be, and how these fit in with company policy. Thus what was "right"
for each party (i.e., what their just shares should be) was a unilateral determination. The essence of traditional "table bargaining," i.e., when the
parties would formally meet openly to place upon the table and to exchange
facts, views, and arguments, make adjustments and compromises, and do
some horse trading, 29 was to be found somewhat touched upon in the third
and eighth points and nowhere else, although this might involve dozens of
sessions. But such meetings would not find GE making concessions or
26. See note 22, supra; M. FoRiosci4, LABOR LAW §§ 432-41, 452-55, 503 (2d ed.
1965) (a general analysis of bargaining pursuant to the National Labor Relations Act,
§§ 8(a)(5), (b)(3), (d), 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(5), (b)(3), (d) (1964)).

27. In NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477 (1960), the Court
felt that "[c]ollective bargaining, then, is not simply an occasion for purely formal
meetings between management and labor, while each maintains an attitude of 'take it
or leave it'; it presupposes a desire to reach ultimate agreement, to enter into a collective bargaining contract." Id. at 485.
28. Id.at 482, quoting from the Board's opinion, Insurance Agents Int'l Union,
119 N.L.R.B. 768, 770-71 (1957).
29. E.g., the union might be willing to come down initswage demands ifthe employer would increase the pension contribution, or the employer might be willing to
increase the wages ifa longer term contract were signed without reopening or escalation clauses. However, wrote Boulware, "trick offers" had been shown to be poor company policy. E.g., in the past GE would make an offer and say:

this "isallwe will do. That's everything we've got." We might be winking
at the union leader while we were saying allthis. We were going to make him
look good. Then after he threatened to call a strike we would give in and

raise our offer 50. We learned that our employees thought that we were
liars who would have stolen 50 an hour from them ifithadn't been for their
union leaders. We decided that ifwe didn't want to be considered liars and
thieves we should stop lying. So we did.
H. NORTHRUP, BOULWARISM 28 (1964).
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changes unless points five or eight were applicable; that is, meetings qua
meetings, without new and pertinent union facts being produced or without
having any significant change in the facts occurring, could not result in any
compromise from points six and seven. As a result GE alone would ultimately determine its no-compromise offer, thereby placing the burden
upon the union to come forward with new facts which the company now
would evaluate and accept or reject, otherwise the union could take the offer
or strike, i.e., TILI of the ultimate or second-face aspect.8 0 In addition, the
unions were to become statistical appendages, serving no useful function
save to check the profferred figures, making dues and memberships wasted
31
efforts, with the IUE, for one, slowly dying.
The changeover in bargaining procedures after 1946 could not be applied
in time to be effective when the 1947 negotiations rolled around, and so GE
again bowed to UE. In 1948 the company offered the Union a two-year contract with a wage increase plus other benefits, which UE accepted after unsuccessful attempts at change. The new bargaining policy thus passed its
first test with flying colors, with GE's procedures including direct publicity
and communications to employees. 32 Whether or not UE's internal and external union problems were the prime cause for its capitulation is immaterial; the following year it was ousted from the CIO and the International
Union of Electrical Workers (IUE) was chartered as a rival union to challenge UE's dominance. IUE immediately won most of the NLRB's representation elections, although it could not eliminate UE entirely from the
scene. At the 1950 bargaining table, GE's package, quickly accepted bS,
UE, was rejected by IUE which sought to gain superior benefits by a series
of "rolling strikes" (successive walkouts at GE's several plants). Eventually,
after so registering its discontent, IUE agreed to the company's basic terms.
30. The NLRB majority in the GE case felt that GE "regards itself as a sort of administrative body which has the unilateral responsibility for determining wages and
working conditions for employees, and it regards the union's role as merely that of a
kind of adviser for an interested group-the employees." 150 N.L.R.B. at 195. See
also H. NORTHRUP, BOULWARIsM 21 (1964): GE's "union policies of the late 1930's
can be best understood as a continuation of its paternalistic policies of the two decades
before." Quaere: did this paternalism continue into the 1960's, which Professor
Northrup may possibly imply, supra note 8, although he states that by 1947 GE began
"moving away from its paternalistic approach toward a 'something for something'
arrangement," id. at 22, and that "[a]nother conclusion reached by the Boulware study
group was the need to eliminate the obsolete vestiges of paternalism." Id. at 26.
31. Since GE's offer was also made to all nonunion employees, these received the
benefits which accrued from any source. Thus, since "the 1960 strike fiasco," "IUE
has lost most NLRB elections conducted among GE employees," H. NORTHRUP, BouLWARISM 69 (1964), (footnoting IUE wins of three of four with a total employment of
less than 100 and losses of at least 10 with total employment of about 2,000).
32. In 1949, a wage-reopening clause was unsuccessfully used by UE to request substantial increases, GE pointing to the business downturn.
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This formed the pre-1960 pattern,83 and with the 1958 negotiations resulting
in a defeat for the IUE, that union was determined to win concessions in
4
1960.3
Boulwarism in 1960
The employment scene at this period showed GE's total of employees at
about 250,000, less than half of whom were organized. IUE represented
slightly less than 70,000, UE about 10,000, and the balance was split among
a variety of independent and affiliated unions.3 5 Both sides now began to
prepare for the 1960 struggle.3 6

The IUE News castigated the company

during the entire two-year period, President James Carey and other union
officials made anti-GE speeches, a half-hour TV movie was distributed, a
large trailer truck moved from plant to plant exhibiting GE horrors, numerous pamphlets were distributed and one was specially prepared for the
shareholder meeting. IUE obtained bargaining coordination and combined
strength with the other AFL-CIO unions at GE. 37 GE was not far behind
in such activities. The economic boom had not materialized, and the cost of
living escalation clauses were a yoke. GE therefore stepped up its communications, prepared and widely circulated special position papers, proselytized
its views and policies among its employees, analyzed and declared meaningless the opposition's poll of the employees for their demands, spelled out to
all workers GE's bargaining methods, had its staff visit the 15 largest plants
and seek out supervisory and management personnel to examine issues and
problems, intensified its research and analyses so as to mitigate cyclical effects, and in general sought to avoid giving Carey any emotional issues.
The 1960 "negotiations," contractually scheduled to begin in August of
1960, factually but not technically and legally (an important distinction)
33. Based upon the bargaining and resulting agreements (and wage reopenings) in
successive years to 1954 and 1958, IUE filed unfair labor practice charges, i.e., failure
to bargain in good faith, against GE. Those charges were dismissed by the NLRB's
General Counsel.

34. James Carey, its President, was quoted, "I owe GE a strike," H. NORTHRUP,

BOULWARIsM 68 n.6 (1964).

35. IUE's representation embraced over 105 appropriate bargaining units whether

directly or through constituent locals, although both IUE and UE historically bargain

on a national or multi-unit basis; there were about 100 other unions representing other
unionized employees.
36. Boulware was replaced in 1957 as GE's labor head (although retained as a
vice president and consultant) and retired in 1960. His job was divided and filled by
two members of his staff who continued his policies.
37. See H. NORTHRUP, BOULWARisM 71-79 (1964). Early in 1959 the Department
of Justice dropped proceedings against the UE, brought under the 1954 Communist
Control Act, and shortly thereafter the Elmira, New York local voted, in a Board election, to return to UE; IUE just barely won at the Lynn, Massachusetts plant. Carey
blamed GE policies for these results. Id.
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began with the IUE's letter of December 22, 1959, requesting an "informal
and unpublicized discussion;" these meetings were held from January 26 to
May 5, 1960. Shortly afterward GE agreed to a June 13th meeting, but
solely to hear the union's presentation and explanation of its demands, and
on the express reservation that this was not the opening of negotiations.
Before June 13th, however, GE publicly submitted to IUE and all its employees a group personal accident insurance policy, separate from and in
addition to the existing contract's contributory plan, but with GE now bearing all new costs. 38 At the June 13th meeting IUE first contended this new
plan was bargainable as it was connected to the existing contract's basic
plan.39 GE took the flat position this was not SO, 4 0 offered to hold off as to
union-represented employees, but insisted upon making and did make it
available to all others. This was the first TILI proposal and offer, and it
is the specific insurance plan so referred to hereafter.
The discussions continued, and for meeting after meeting, into August,
both sides made analyses and presentations, with both meanwhile publicizing their views, offers, and analyses. On August 27th GE's final proposal
was completed. Two days later it was previewed by Carey and others and
on August 30th presented formally, with GE publicizing the details despite
the union's request for delay. The union "objected vigorously to the absence
of a cost of living escalator.

The next day . . .GE modified its proposal

to include, as an option instead of the second 4 percent wage increase, a
wage reopener .... -41 During the negotiations a few other insufficiencies in GE's offer developed and, as Professor Northrup puts it, "numerous other changes in the original [GE] offer were made."'42 By September 29th a stalemate was clear; a strike was imminent by October 2d.
GE had offered its package to the Schenectady, New York, and Pittsfield,
38. It was to become effective in July but was actually put into effect late in September. The plan, as time-presented here, is prior to the time at which formal bargaining was required or technically being held. It is this plan which is the only specific take-it-or-leave-it (TILI) proposal or offer made by GE. But as noted above,
before the Second Circuit the term is used additionally and separately to refer to
Boulwar'sm in general.
39. IUE contended it was thereby prejudiced in its later negotiations concerning insurance, and that "the company in offering the insurance at that time on a take-it-orleave-it basis was attempting to discredit the union and 'undermine' collective bargaining." 150 N.L.R.B. at 208.
40. The Trial Examiner rejected GE's contention of a union waiver. Id. at 269
n.115.
41. H. NORTHRUP, BOULWARISM 83 (1964).
42. Id. at 85. In contrast, Judge Kaufman's opinion in NLRB v. General Elec. Co.,
418 F.2d 736 (2d Cir. 1969) said:
there were few modifications made in the original GE offer. The Company did propose an extra week's vacation after 25 years in exchange for a
smaller wage increase; but Union officials had indicated at the outset that they
were uninterested ....

After declaring late in September that the "whole
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Massachusetts, locals directly; after the strike began GE also made the
offer to other locals. The strike lasted for three weeks and was then called
off, with the unions taking a beating. The NLRB and the courts now took
over.
TILl Before the Trial Examiner and Labor Board
Charges and counter-charges were filed by the parties, those against the IUE
being determined by requiring it to post notices. 43 The basic charge against
GE was that it had violated its Section 8(a)(5) statutory duty to bargain in
good faith. 44 After extended hearings the Trial Examiner made his intermediate report and the Labor Board's opinion thereafter adopted his recommendations. Both the report and the opinion referred 45 to NLRB v.
Katz, 46 decided by the Supreme Court in 1962, which provides an excellent
back-drop against which to cast and clarify the GE opinions and holdings.
In Katz the Supreme Court reviewed a Second Circuit opinion which
had relied on NLRB v. Insurance Agents' International Union,4 7 in holding
that no bargaining violation occurred "when bargaining is in fact being carried on," unless separately there was a "finding of the respondent's subjective bad faith in negotiating. '48 The lower court also felt "that the unilateral acts here complained of, occurring as they did during the negotiating
of a collective bargaining agreement, do not per se constitute a refusal to
bargain collectively and per se are not violative of § 8(a)(5) .

.

.

. [I]n

the posture of this case a necessary requisite" is the subjective bad faith
finding.49 Put differently, the objective unilateral acts during bargaining
were felt by the lower court not to be per se objective violations; therefore, a
finding of subjective bad faith was required to sustain the Board's holding of
a Section 8(a)(5) violation.
offer" was "on the table," GE contrary to prior practice, brought its position
home by making its three per cent wage increase offer effective for unrepresented employees before the end of the contract or UE acceptance.
Id.at 743.
GE's reluctance to submit to further changes was explained by a GE negotiator who
spoke against changing a particular proposal: "it would make GE 'look foolish in the
eyes of employees and others....'" Id. at 745. The specific proposal involved referred to the union's SUB proposal made September 28th, virtually at the expiration of
the contract and at the end of the pre-strike bargaining.
43. For this notice, see H. NORTHRUP, BOULWARISM 93 (1964). For the eventual
GE notice, see 150 N.L.R.B. at 287.
44. National Labor Relations Act § 8(a)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1964); as
defined in § 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1964).
45. 150 N.L.R.B. at 268, 194.
46. 369 U.S. 736 (Brennan, J. for an unanimous Court). Brennan also wrote the
Insurance Agents' opinion, note 47 infra.
47. 361 U.S. 477 (1960).
48. NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 737-38 (1962).
49. NLRB v. Katz, 289 F.2d 700, 702-03(2d Cir. 1961).
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Both the per se position and that separately requiring the finding of subjective bad faith were rejected by the High Court which felt that each of
three objective unilateral acts during bargaining of necessity indicated bad
faith and therefore per se constituted violations. 50 The first such act "frustrat[ed] the statutory objective," 51 the second, "conclusively manifest[ed]
bad faith ' 52 and was "necessarily inconsistent with a sincere desire to conclude an agreement," 53 and the third "too must be viewed as tantamount to
an outright refusal to negotiate on that subject, and therefore as a violation.

.
....

54

The Court, however, did not go beyond these objective per se rulings
into any subjective bad faith aspects. Katz is not authority for permitting a

finding of general subjective bad faith to follow automatically from a particular objective-fact per se violation. Neither does it support use of a particular objective-fact per se violation (alone or in conjunction with other
facts) to support a general subjective bad faith finding, i.e., a "totality of
circumstances" finding.5 5 The Katz Court noted the Board's decision "which
expressly disclaimed any finding that the totality of the respondents' conduct
manifested bad faith in the pending negotiations. ' 56 In other words, Katz
pointed up the Court's view that Section 8(a)(5), "may be violated without
a general failure of subjective good faith [and] . . .that an employer's unilateral change in conditions of employment under negotiation is . . . a

[factual] violation" per se. 57 In Court language:
Clearly, the duty thus defined may be violated without a general
50. The first act was a changing of a sick-leave plan without notifying or consulting
with the union.
This action plainly frustrated the statutory objective of establishing working
conditions through bargaining. Some employees might view the change to be
a diminution of benefits. Others, more interested in accumulating sick-leave
days, might regard the change as an improvement. If one view or the other
clearly prevailed among the employees, the unilateral action might well mean
that the employer had either uselessly dissipated trading material or aggravated
the sick-leave issue. On the other hand, if the employees were more evenly
divided on the merits of the company's changes, the union negotiators, beset
by conflicting factions, might be led to adopt a protective vagueness on the
issue of sick leave, which also would inhibit the useful discussion contemplated by Congress in imposing the specific obligation to bargain collectively.
Id. at 744. The second unilateral act was increasing of wages, and the third related
to merit increases.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 745.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 746.
55. See the GE Court of Appeals' view of this terminology, note 141 infra and
accompanying text. Conversely, Katz is not authority for refusing to permit an objective per se violation to be used solely for the latter purpose, i.e., alone or in conjunction
to support a general subjective bad faith finding.
56. 369 U.S. at 737.
57. Id. at 743. The time-fact of the bargaining, during which the conduct oc-
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failure of subjective good faith; for there is no occasion to consider the issue of good faith if a party has refused even to negotiate
in fact-"to meet . . . and confer"-about any of the mandatory
subjects. A refusal to negotiate in fact as to any subject which is
within §8(d), and about which the union seeks to negotiate,
violates §8(a)(5) though the employer has every desire to reach
agreement with the union upon an over-all collective agreement
and earnestly and in all good faith bargains to that end. We hold
that an employer's unilateral change in conditions of employment
under negotiation is similarly a violation of §8(a)(5), for it is a
circumvention of the duty to negotiate which frustrates the objectives of §8(a) (5) much as does a flat refusal. 58
The quotation: (1) emphasizes "in fact," i.e., a solid basis of factual
evidence to hold that a party has refused even to negotiate about any of the
mandatory subjects; 59 then (2) holds that where this preceding fact is found,
the party's subjective good faith, i.e., he has every desire to reach an over-all
agreement and earnestly and in all good faith otherwise bargains to that end,
is immaterial; and (3) declares that, similar to this preceding objective factual violation regardless of subjective good faith, an objective unilateral
change of employment conditions under negotiation is per se a violation.
The only other question raised by the language in Katz is whether the
Court's use of "an employer's unilateral change in conditions of employment
under negotiation" reads either as a change "in any of the conditions" or "in
certain conditions," i.e., must each particular factual change be determined
to be or not to be such a per se violation?
The historical approach of not only the Board but also that of the Supreme
Court to this question is to particularize, decide each issue and fact as and
when it necessarily appears for determination, and not to make broad pronouncements. 60 In Katz the Court particularly discussed and decided three
separate fact changes by the employer acting unilaterally where the union
demanded mandated items be bargained, and these are its holdings; the
generalized language as above quoted is not to be used to umbrella every
conceivable change under all circumstances. 6' The Court's final views also
curred, was relied on by Judge Friendly in the Court of Appeals as distinguishing Katz
from GE. See note 136 infra.

58. 369 U.S. at 743.
59. On mandatory and nonmandatory subjects for collective bargaining, and the
requirement that a party, on demand by the other, so negotiate in good faith concerning
the former, although as to the latter no such duty exists under the Act, see M. FORKOSCH, LABOR LAW § 434 (2d ed. 1965).

60. See, e.g., Justice Black's statement: "Each case must turn upon its particular facts.
The inquiry must always be whether or not under the circumstances of the particular
case the statutory obligation to bargain in good faith has been met." NLRB v. Truitt
Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149, 153-54 (1956).
61. See, e.g., the Court's final statement that "we do not foreclose the possibility that
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support this conclusion for it stressed the power of the Board "to order the
cessation of behavior which is in effect a refusal to negotiate," i.e., the refusal to bargain on the three mandated items, "or which directly obstructs or
inhibits the actual process of discussion," i.e., the frustration resulting
from the sick-leave plan, 2 "or which reflects a cast of mind against reaching
agreement," i.e., the overall problem and violation under a totality of circumstances approach. 63 The instant unilateral conduct by the employer
"must of necessity [objectively] obstruct bargaining . . . [and] will often
disclose an unwillingness [subjectively] to agree with the union . . . [so]
that the Board may . . .[denounce] such unilateral action . . . without also

finding the employer guilty of over-all subjective bad faith." 64 Nevertheless, the objective fact violations on a per se basis were limited in Katz to the
three mentioned. Are there others that can be so held to be per se violations of Section 8(a)(5)? Obviously yes, e.g., a refusal to discuss specific
wage or hour demands unquestionably constitutes such a violation. 65
With Katz before him, the GE Trial Examiner thus knew that TILI
might be analyzed as a new tactic66 in the employer's (or union's) arsenal
of bargaining methods, subject, however, to the time-facts before him, the
General Counsel's complaint and proof, and the Board's power to decide
against it. The time-facts disclosed that the insurance plan TILI was involved in the pre-bargaining stage;6 7 but the General Counsel had rejected
such a finding; 68 and therefore no pesent need to so determine existed. The
time-facts, nevertheless, permit several questions to be conjured: (1) Is an
employer "prohibited from even putting such a proposal to a union at a time
when bargaining is not required under the contract unless he is willing to
there might be circumstances which the Board could or should accept as excusing or
justifying unilateral action, [although] no such case is presented here." 369 U.S. at
748.
62. See note 50, supra.
63. 369 U.S. at 747.
64. Id.
65. For other illustrations see: NLRB v. Acme Indus. Co., 385 U.S. 432 (1967)
(removal of machinery, but involving the contract's grievance machinery); NLRB v.
Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149 (1956) (refusing to supply information but as there
conditioned); National Licorice Co. v. NLRB, 309 U.S. 350 (1940) (certain clauses as
illegal restraints on employees' rights); NLRB v. General Elec. Co., 418 F.2d 736, 767
(2d Cir. 1969) (Friendly, J.); Midas Int'l Corp., 150 N.L.R.B. 486 (1964) (refusal
to mediate not a per se violation); M. FORKOSCn, LABOR LAW §§ 854-67 (2d ed. 1965).
66. In Local 2647, Lumber Workers, 130 N.L.R.B. 235 (1961), the parties had bargained in good faith for about five months, with an impasse finally resulting. The
union then gave the employer an ultimatum, backed by a strike threat, to sign without
consulting further with its bargaining agent. The Board upheld this conduct observing
that a strike prior to the ultimatum would not have violated the Act, and so likewise a
strike preceded by a final "take it or face a strike" basis after a breakdown in goodfaith bargaining was not a violation.
67. See note 38 supra.
68. See note 78 infra.
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bargain about it then and there?" 6 9 (2) Since the insurance plan was actually
put into effect in late September, when contractually (and legally) required
bargaining had begun in August, did the early TIL offer now spill over into
the mandatorily bargainable area so that, upon union demand, GE was
compelled to bargain, failing which a per se violation occurred? (3) Was
such a demand not made (so found by the Trial Examiner), thereby relieving
GE of any obligation to bargain as to this in August or September? (4)
Regardless of the preceding second and third aspects, and even within the
time element of the first, was the original TILT offer per se an objective-fact
violation? (5) Could it be used as some evidence to support a finding that
it frustrated and inhibited union bargaining or a finding of a general sub70
jective bad faith violation?
What the Trial Examiner did was to suggest or hint that TILI (as continued) could have been a per se violation, but to use it only to support a
finding of a general violation under the totality of circumstances approach.
The method he used to accomplish this was as follows: he discussed TILI
in his chronology 7' and then said, "A fair reading of the record does not
support that assertion [that GE refused to bargain on this insurance item],
however. So far as appears, the Union never made the added accident insurance a matter of formal demand during the negotiations. ' 72 He thereafter discussed the "independent violations" of Section 8(a)(5) 73 under
GE's refusal to furnish information and its bargaining with the locals directly,74 finding against the company in both situations. In next analyzing the
"alleged overall bad-faith bargaining" charge, he begun, "Included within the
69. 418 F.2d at 765 (dissent). See also note 136 inlra.
70. As to this last, if the TILI evidence alone could sustain this finding then it was a
per se violation; therefore the Examiner either felt that it was not a per se violation or
else that even if it were he desired, rather, to have the general finding so as not to
be confronted by the Katz dilemma, that if the Supreme Court felt it not to be a per se
violation then the entire case would be dismissed, whereas if it were, then a general violation would "automatically" be supported.
71. 150 N.L.R.B. at 213-15.
72. Id. at 215. This exact factual omission is the key to the later dissent by Judge
Friendly in the GE case where he felt GE committed no violation "by submitting a
contributory personal accident insurance plan to the Union and declining to bargain
about it until the time for reopening of negotiations." 418 F.2d at 764-65. However, what of such a refusal afterwards, and upon demand? Also, did the Judge overlook the fact that not only was there such a refusal to bargain but also submission to
nonunion employees and publicizing of the offer prior to negotiations? Would these
facts, if not included in the Judge's remarks, have made a difference? It is the publicizing which is at the heart of the majority's approach.
73. Throughout this discussion any charges or violations under other subdivisions
are not treated, either when separately found or in conjunction with Section 8(A) (5).
74. 150 N.L.R.B. at 256-66. The Trial Examiner referred to the General Counsel's
reliance on certain specific allegations in the complaint "not only as lending support to
the broad bad-faith bargaining allegation, but also as spelling out in themselves independent violations .... ." Id. at 256.
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framework of that issue are the specific allegations . . . [concerning] the

alleged independent violations that have already been considered and ruled
upon."'75 His discussion, however, did not further refer to these independent
violations. 76 In conclusion he found that "on the totality of the Respondent's
conduct at and away from the bargaining table, without, however, giving
conclusive weight to any separate element," a Section 8(a)(5) violation re77
sulted.
But in this totality of conduct the Trial Examiner had already included
various items other than the specific violations used first as independent per
se violations, and next to bolster the general finding. One of these
other items was the TILI insurance plan, and this was the first item he discussed under the alleged general violation. He referred to his earlier finding
that GE had not refused to bargain on the insurance plan, 78 and that while
the General Counsel
was not contending that it was a "per se violation," [still,]
the issue relating to it was fully litigated and briefed by all parties
as a distinct element in the case. On the basis of the facts developed . . . [the insurance plan] involved a bargainable subject
. . . [and so] I find that the Respondent's presentation . . . on a

conceded take-it-or-leave-it basis constituted a rejection of the
principle of collective bargaining, violative of Section 8(a)(5) of
the Act, thereby reflecting adversely79on the Respondent's general
attitude toward collective bargaining.
In other words, the Trial Examiner felt that (1) while a per se violation
could be used twice, i.e., to support an independent violation and to bolster a
general one, and (2) that even though TIL here should be considered to be
a per se violation, still, (3) he would not so find and hold as it was not so
charged and claimed by the General Counsel, but that (5) it would be used
as one part of the factual evidence under a general charge and finding of a
Section 8(a)(5) violation.80
75. Id. at 267.
76. Although, in his penultimate conclusion, while the Examiner stated that his
other findings supported "a substantial inference" of a lack of good faith by GE, the
company's refusal to furnish information "goes beyond establishing an independent violation of Section 8(a)(5). It also strongly supports a finding of overall bad faith ...
[as does its] conduct in bypassing the Union . . . [which] also bears significantly on
the Respondent's overall bargaining attitude." Id. at 282.
77. Id. at 283.
78. "A finding of a separate violation based [on the TILI offer] was requested by
the Union in its brief and at oral argument." Id. at 269 n.114. GE had claimed
the insurance plan was not a bargainable matter, but the Examiner, Board, and Second Circuit held against it on this. It nevertheless further claimed a waiver on this
aspect, which is not here discussed. On waiver in general, see M. FORKOSCH, LABOR
LAW 703 (2d ed. 1965).
See also Henry I. Siegel Co. v. NLRB, 340 F.2d 309,
310 (2d Cir. 1965).
79. 150 N.L.R.B. at 269.
80. But the General Counsel's brief in the Second Circuit contended the contrary:
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If the preceding is a correct picture of the Trial Examiner's report, findings, and holdings, then he, the Board and the Second Circuit each erred
when the TILI insurance plan came before them. The Trial Examiner's
error lay in failing to distinguish the TILI time aspects in the pre-bargaining
and bargaining stages and, perhaps, holding as to the former that this "narrow
issue" should be decided in favor of GE.8 Both the Board and Second
Circuit affirmed his error while erring further, suggesting, without any overruling of the Trial Examiner on his finding of fact, that TILI could be con2
sidered independently as a specific violation.
The Board's error is further disclosed by the following. Its third opening
paragraph stated that the Trial Examiner had found that Respondent had not
bargained in good faith as evidenced by four items: (1) failing to furnish
information; (2) dealing separately with the locals; (3) presenting its insurance plan on a TILI basis; and (4) "[i]ts overall approach to and conduct of bargaining." 8 The Board's language is ambiguous. The Examiner
had found no separate and specific TILI per se violation, as with the information and local-dealing issues, whereas now it is separately considered; the
Board is not, however, incorrect in stating that the Examiner had found a
violation "as evidenced by" TILL. The TILI item was one of several to
support his finding of a general violation. Nevertheless, at no time did the
Board specifically and unequivocally make an affirmative statement or
holding that the TILI plan was a per se violation, although by a process of
reverse reasoning this may be concluded. To illustrate this reverse reasoning,
there were majority, concurring, and partially dissenting opinions. The
box-score discloses that: two of the five board members, Fanning and Jenkins, specifically felt that the TILI offer was not "unlawful; '8 4 Fanning neverthe-less felt the TILI offer could be used to support the finding of an overall
lack of good faith by GE;8 5 Jenkins felt that while the record supported the
specific findings of GE's violations by refusing to give information and deal"
"We submit, however, that the Examiner plainly found an independent violation ....
Brief for Petitioner at 64 n.20, NLRB v. General Elec. Co., 418 F.2d 736 (1969). The
Court of Appeals' majority opinion, however, does not unequivocally so hold.
81. See note 72 supra.
82. Although Judge Kaufman, for the Second Circuit majority, did seek in a rather
complex manner to overcome this time distinction element, his analysis seems to
misunderstand what the Board did.
83. 150 N.L.R.B. at 193.
84. Id. at 193 n.3 (Fanning), 198 (Jenkins). Leedom, who completed the threemember majority in favor of the TILI finding (as shortly discussed), was replaced the
following year; the new member (Zagoria) had not indicated his views by December
1969, when he resigned, and his replacement (possibly Edward B. Miller, as of this
writing) may probably, at the least follow the Leedom approach. The term of 1960
Chairman McCulloch expires in August 1970, with the second Nixon appointee undoubtedly rejecting the McCulloch stance.
85. Id. at 193 n.3.
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ing separately with the locals,8 6 he did not feel the general overall violation
of a lack of good faith was proved;87 in this rejection of the overall finding
he was joined by Leedom who nevertheless "agree[d] with the specific
violations found";88 the remaining two board members upheld all the specific and the general findings. Thus two specifically rejected a TILI per se
violation; two rejected the overall violation; and all upheld the particular
violations (save for TILI as above). One can therefore urge that unless a
three-member majority specifically opposed the two-member specific rejection of TILI, there would have been no need to make any fuss about it and
therefore, pari passu, three members supported and upheld a per se TILI
violation.
This reasoning is, however, not sufficient to support a contention that the
Board, or a majority, has definitively ruled such a TILI offer to be a per se
violation of Section 8(a)(5). The reason is that the Trial examiner and
the Board's three members utilized the TILI offer as part of a theoretical
pattern of GE bargaining, and also within the context of the actual bargaining as it occurred. Thus it is factually impossible to disassociate the insurance offer from the other facts and discuss it in isolation. In effect, that is
about what the majority may have concluded because, even though the Trial
Examiner found a violation of Section 8(a)(5) as evidenced by the four
items, one of which was the inusrance plan offer, the three majority members
refused to state their own views or to disagree squarely with the per se rejection by the two minority members. Perhaps this indicates that such a TILI
offer, without other facts may conceivably not be a bargaining violation.8 9
86. Another item is not discussed here, namely, GE's importuning of the locals to
abandon or not support the eventual strike. Id. at 198 (Jenkins dissent).
87. Id. at 198: "However, in view of the fact that the majority has gone beyond
conduct and indeed concedes that it is not basing its finding of overall bad faith on

conduct but rather is basing that finding on an assessment of Respondent's approach to
its duty to bargain in good faith, I am constrained to disavow their comments concerning the employer's bargaining technique."

In this he was later joined by Judge

Friendly (dissenting partially in the circuit court), who felt that specific conduct, not a
generality, should be castigated.

It may be urged, of course, that no outright rejection of the overall finding is given
but, rather, merely a disavowal of comments about technique. However, this is
splitting hairs too finely. In the circuit court Judge Friendly agreed with Board Member
Jenkins as to the legality of the TILI insurance plan offer, and also agreed with him
"that other specific conduct of the Company . . . effective date of the pension plan ...
[and] the form of the strike settlement agreement ...
could properly have been

condemned ...." 418 F.2d at 765.
88. 150 N.L.R.B. at 200. He also discussed the applicability of the so-called free
speech section's application to GE's communications to its employees, and while not

rejecting their use as "some evidence of bad faith," desired that "guides" be given the
company so that "it can with reasonable certainty determine what it can lawfully say to
its employees." Id. at 203. The free speech section is National Labor Relations Act
§ 8(c), 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (1964).
89. The operative term is "conceivably," and even the later Kaufman opinion may
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Although if other facts are added, or the proposal is placed within a particular context, a different conclusion may be warranted. 90
To support this overall view of the Board's ambiguous, or at least nonspecific, use of the TILI insurance plan, not only is the analysis which
shortly follows concerning the use of TILI in a general bad faith violation
applicable here, but so also is the Board majority's quotation from the 1960
Insurance Agents' case. In that case Justice Brennan, for the majority, wrote
that while adding Section 8(d) to the Wagner Act (National Labor Relations Act) in the 1959 amendments and thereby defining the duty to bargain
collectively, Congress simultaneously imposed the correlative duty on unions
through Section 8(b)(3). The legislative history
makes it plain that Congress was wary of the position of some
unions, and wanted to ensure that they would approach the
bargaining table with the same attitude of willingness to reach an
agreement as had been enjoined on management earlier. It intended to prevent employee representatives from putting forth the
same 'take it or leave it' attitude that had been condemned in
management. 91
Earlier the Justice had written that collective bargaining was not a series of

"purely formal meetings . . . while each [party] maintains an attitude of

'take it or leave it' . . . ."92
In both quotations the Justice spoke of an
attitude, not a proposal as such and without more; throughout their opinions
the Board members echoed this view, and the majority reiterated this approach, especially in disclaiming the accusation of another member, i.e.,
"that our decision is not based on an assessment of Respondent's conduct,
but only on its approach to or techniques in bargaining. '03 These latter
are procedural, not substantive, and this differentiation may be significant.
Use of TILl as a GeneralBad Faith Violation
Whereas the insurance TILI plan may be considered as an objective fact,
have so implied. E.g., it set forth "the principle that acts not in themselves unfair
labor practices may support an inference that a party is acting in bad faith." 418 F.2d
at 757. Previously Judge Kaufman had stated: "When such conduct [a per se violation] is present, the Board need make no finding that the totality of the party's conduct
manifests bad faith; the practice itself is conclusive on that issue." Id. at 756. This
means that a practice not bad per se cannot, without more, support any unfair labor
practice finding, even though in conjunction with one or more additional practices also not bad per se they may now support the inference of bad faith. Of course
the majority had theretofore discussed the TILI offer and (questionably) denounced it
on a per se basis.
90. In the ordinary case it may be rare to find a TILl proposal sans other facts.
91. NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 487 (1960), quoted in
150 N.L.R.B. at 197.
92. 361 U.S. at 485.
93. 150 NLRB at 196.
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regardless of intent, motive, or state of mind, the present overall violation is
peculiarly subjective. Phrased differently, a TILI offer requires language,
oral or written, which can be testified to or introduced as an exhibit and
made a finding of external fact, i.e., the people involved can be disassociated
94
from this fact which, analogous to real evidence introduced upon a trial,
thereafter need have no connection with any individual. Whereas TILI can
thus be theoretically considered in a vacuum, it would be impossible for an
objective bad faith factual violation to be so conceived. Almost by common
usage, regardless of dictionary or statutory definition, this objective term
now connotes a state of mind which cannot be known (assuming no "confession") without circumstantial or other evidence, inferences therefrom,
and a subjective evaluation by the determiner. 95 The unfair labor practice
or statutory violation is merely that the employer or the union "refuse to
bargain collectively," 96 but the statutory Section 8(d) definition is also not
very clarifying: "to bargain collectively is the performance of the mutual
obligation . . . [to] confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and
other terms and conditions of employment . . . ...This language must be

interpreted and applied, which brings us to what Congress said about it,
how the Labor Board and the Supreme Court view it, and how TILI (specific
or general) fits into the picture.
97
Just ten years ago the High Court decided the Insurance Agents' case.
There the union announced in February that if a new contract were not
reached in March, when the old one expired, its "members would then participate in a 'Work Without a Contract' program-which meant that they
would engage in certain planned, concerted on-the-job activities designed to
harass the company." 98 March came, no contract emerged, the union-employer bargaining sessions and discussions continued, and the threatened program was instituted, 99 but with an employer charge now filed, on which a
complaint issued, charging a union refusal to bargain in good faith. The
94. See, e.g., 1 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 24 (3d ed. 1940).
95. See, e.g., Forkosch, Credibility Gap in Judicial Review of Administrative Determinations, 18 CLEV.-MAR. L. REV. 257 (1969).
96. Both Section 8(a)(5) and its counterpart Section 8(b)(3) use this identical
language, 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(5), § 158(b)(3) (1964).
97. NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477 (1960).
98. Id. at 480.
99. The tactics included refusal to solicit new business, refusal to comply with the
company's reporting procedures, refusal to participate in campaigns, reporting late, refusal to perform customary duties, engaging in "sit-in-mornings" and "doing what comes
naturally," leaving at noon as a group, absenting themselves from specially arranged
conferences, picketing and distributing leaflets outside company offices and to policyholders, soliciting policyholder signatures on petitions and presenting these "to the
company at its home office while simultaneously engaging in mass demonstrations
there." Id. at 480-81.
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Trial Examiner recommended that the complaint be dismissed but the
Board refused and held against the union. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia felt otherwise; and the Supreme Court affirmed. The Trial Examiner had found nothing in the record to support
any inference of the union's failure to bargain in good faith except the tactics
engaged in by the union during negotiations; "in fact nothing else was relied
10 0
upon by the Board's General Counsel in prosecuting the complaint."'
On this record the Board felt that "irrespective of the union's good faith in
conferring with the employer at the bargaining table for the purpose and with
the desire of reaching agreement on contract terms, its tactics during the
course of the negotiations constituted per se a violation of §8(b)(3)."101
Or, even assuming union good faith at the negotiations, the tactics themselves, without more, were a per se violation. The Supreme Court, however,
felt that even if these tactics were assumed not to be protected activities under
Section 7 of the Act' 0 2 (thereby permitting the employer to discharge the
employees or take other appropriate disciplinary action against them),
still, this "does not mean that it constitutes a refusal to bargain in good
faith . . . [because] there is simply no inconsistency between the applica-

tion of economic pressure and good-faith collective bargaining.' 0 3 And so,
as upon the admitted and limited fact-situation no per se violation could be
inferred or found, the Court majority refused to permit the Board to move
"into a new area of regulation which Congress had not committed to it,
[i.e., defining] through its processes what economic sanctions might be permitted negotiating parties in an 'ideal' or 'balanced' state of collective
bargaining.' u0 4

The minority agreed that "upon all the evidence . . . the

Board's conclusion [of a union violation] must fall" for insubstantiality;
that it did not appear that the union's tactic was to stall at the bargaining
table "until its conduct outside the negotiations might force Prudential
to capitulate to its demands, nor does any other evidence give the color of
pretence to its netgotiating procedure.' 105 Therefore, according to the
minority, since the Board felt that the union's "tactics were, without more,
sufficient evidence of a lack of a sincere desire to reach agreement to make
other consideration of its conduct unnecessary," remand to the agency should
occur "for further opportunity to introduce pertinent evidence, if any there
100. Id. at 481.
101. Id. at 482.
102. The Court first assumed, without deciding, that the union's activities "were not
'protected' under § 7 of the Act." Id. at 483 n.6. But later the Court "agree[d]
arguendo with the Board . . . that the employee conduct here was not a protected
concerted activity." Id. at 492-93.
103. Id. at 494-95.
104. Id. at 499-500.
105. Id. at 514.
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be, of respondent's lack of good faith."'10 6 In effect the entire Court agreed
that such tactics were not in themselves necessarily to be considered a lack
of good faith and therefore a per se violation, with the minority only desiring
to give the Board the opportunity to bring in further evidence on a remand.
The minority, however, also added in a final paragraph:
Viewed as a determination by the Board that it could, quite
apart from respondent's state of mind, proscribe its tactics because
they were not "traditional," or were thought to be subject to public
disapproval, or because employees who engaged in them may
proceeds
have been subject to discharge, the Board's conclusion
07
from the application of an erroneous rule of law.'
In effect, that is what the majority felt, i.e., that the Board's approach was
erroneous unless it could be defended "as resting on some unique character
of the union tactics involved here.' 0 8 The Board's power to find a violation
by inferring a lack of good faith under the statutory definition must stem
from "deficiencies of the union's performance at the bargaining table [and
not "solely and simply"] by reason of its attempted use of economic pressure," for otherwise "the Board in the guise of determining good or bad faith
in negotiations could regulate what economic weapons a party might summon to its aid." In turn, this would permit the Board to "be in a position to
exercise considerable influence upon the substantive terms on which the
parties contract,"' 0 9 a result not desired by Congress which "intended that
the parties should have wide latitude in their negotiations, unrestricted by any
governmental power to regulate the substantive solution to their differ0
ences.""
The preceding analyses and conclusions are not, however, the final High
Court words on this. A possible modification, if not different result, is suggested by NLRB v. Truitt Manufacturing Co."' At present a few preliminary and tentative conclusions and questions may be drawn. Collective
bargaining may be divided, for present purposes, into substantive and procedural; the ordinary and usual bargaining tactics of a party obviously
are procedural where these are used to obtain any advantage in and during
the bargaining process, or to compel"12 or be traded for" 83 a substantive
106. Id.
107.

Id. at 514-15.

108. Id. at 488.
109. "As the parties' own devices became more limited, the Government might
have to enter even more directly into the negotiation of collective agreements. Our
labor policy is not presently erected on a foundation of government control of the
results of negotiations." Id. at 490.
110. Id. at 488.
111. 351 U.S. 149 (1956).
112. The economic pressure resulting from a tactic necessitates capitulation in
whole or in part, as where a permissible strike or lockout brings pressure upon the other
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item. Regardless of what the parties could or did do prior to the statutory
requirements, good faith is today a required element in such collective
bargaining. Economic pressure devices or tactics, and good faith in the bargaining process, "exist side by side"' 1 4 and may be used and found simultaneously. Obviously there are some tactics, e.g., unadulterated violence,
and some of the substantive matters in the bargaining such as a hot-cargo
clause, which cannot be used or sought and which per se undoubtedly
impugn one's good faith. 1 5 Aside from such tactics or items, the Board
does not have any power under Sections 8(b)(3) or 8(a)(5) "to distinguish among various economic pressure tactics and brand . . . [some]
inconsistent with good-faith collective bargaining.""' 6
Quaere: is a valid and ordinarily negotiable substantive item involved in
the collective bargaining, which is definitely and positively 1 7 submitted
at the outset on a TILI basis, rendered nonbargainable because the TILI is
per se sufficient to support a finding of a Section 8(a)(5) violation; or is the
TILI to be considered only as one (new) form of economic pressure among
various tactics in the arsenal of the bargaining process and therefore without
the power of the Board? Assuming the TILI not to be sufficient for a per se
violation, may such a tactic nevertheless be considered as one piece of
evidence in determining a party's overall lack of good faith on the basis of
substantial evidence? 1 8 Conversely, assuming it per se sufficient as a
violation, may the TILI item next also be used to support a second and
additional, though separate, overall finding of a lack of good faith; 119 or,
if once used for a per se finding, must it be rejected for this second overall
purpose?
The Board's several opinions are not absolutely conclusive as to the
acceptance or rejection of the bifurcation and other aspects just discussed.
party, as in the Insurance Agents' case. This economic pressure "is of itself not at
all inconsistent with the duty of bargaining in good faith." NLRB v. Insurance Agents'
Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 490-91 (1960).
113. See, e.g., 418 F.2d at 747 (Judge Kaufman): "A collective bargaining agreement is a compromise not only between the parties, but of their past, present, and
future goals. . . . [A party] may believe that it is important to keep . . . [certain]
benefits within narrow bounds, so that at the next negotiating session it will be able
to press more vigorously for other benefits."
114. 361 U.S. at 489.
115. See, e.g., M. FORKoscH, LABOR LAW §§ 432-40, 452-54, 503, 504-05 (the hotcargo clause) (2d ed. 1965).
116. 361 U.S. at 492.
117. These adverbs may go beyond the GE-IUE facts, but are used so as to eliminate any possible loophole at this point.
118. Justice Frankfurter, but not Justice Brennan, was specific in stating that "the
Board's conclusion must fall for want of support in the evidence as a whole." 361 U.S.
at 514. See generally M. FORKOSCH, LABOR LAW §§ 396-402, 514 (2d ed. 1965).
119. The Board and Court herein adopt this proposal, although not stating it as
definitely.
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The Board majority's inconclusiveness in the GE case on TILI as a per se
violation nevertheless still left the total picture violation, which in effect is
what the Supreme Court's minority in the Insurance Agents' case felt could
be done. The Board's majority thus seemingly adopted both positions,
albeit unable or refusing to make a positive holding as to the first, or per se,
one. 120 Its first statement was a rejection of Board Member Jenkins' contention:
Our decision is not based on an assessment of Respondents' conduct, but only on its approach to or techniques in bargaining. On
the contrary our determination is based upon our review of the
Respondent's entire course of conduct. Its failure to furnish relevant information, its attempts to deal separately with locals and
to bypass the national bargaining representative, the manner of its
presentation of the accident insurance proposal, the disparagement
of the Union as bargaining representative by the communication
program, its conduct of the negotiations themselves, and its attitude
or approach as revealed by all these factors. . . . Our decision
rests rather upon a consideration of the totality of the Respondent's
conduct. 121
Within this totality there was included "the manner of its presentation of the
accident insurance proposal."'1 22 This tactical presentation, not a substantive content consideration, 2 3 followed and upheld the examiner's
parallel views and language.' 24 But immediately thereafter the two members (in the majority of three) pointed to the third's views on TILI,
120. To what extent the Examiner's report, views, conclusions and recommendations
influenced this indecision may be somewhat understood by examining his own bifurcation and analysis. See text and notes commencing with note 66 supra, especially
the text at note 80 supra.
121. General Elec. Co., 150 N.L.R.B. 192, 196-97 (1964). Judge Friendly quoted
this as a statement by the Board majority "that its finding of overall bad faith was not
based upon identifiable acts or failures to act that GE could avoid in the future but
rather 'upon our review.' " 418 F.2d at 765. He then stated that such Board attempts
to restrict communications, or to lay down bargaining standards as to techniques,
attitudes, and approaches bring a collision with Section 8(c)'s free speech, and Section
8(d)'s definition, and their policies. He cautioned against intrusion "into areas which
Congress left to the parties," and in his "peroration" (per Kaufman, id. at 762)
quoted present Chief Justice Burger's dissenting comment, in United Steelworkers of
America v. NLRB, 390 F.2d 846, 858 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 904
(1968), that "today's holding contains the seeds of danger for unions," as well as for
employers, and added that such a "portentous step" should not be taken here. 418
F.2d at 774. To this, Judge Kaufman retorted that Friendly "conjures up the dark
spectre . . . [of a] picturesque characterization [which] is unfortunate for it is a
scare-phrase which tends to distract from the facts in this case." Id. at 762.
122. 150 N.L.R.B. at 196.
123. The majority emphasized that it was not discussing "any required substance
or content of agreements" Id. at 197. "Nothing in our decision bans fact gathering or
any specific method of formulating proposals. We prescribe no timetable for negotiators." Id. at 196-97. See also on substantive content aspect, note 195 inIra.
124. See, e.g., text at note 79 supra.
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and then, as "decisively answered," quoted from the Insurance Agents'
language that Congress had "intended to prevent employee representatives
from putting forth the same 'take it or leave it' attitude that had been condemned in management. 1" 5 In addition, the two sought further to answer
the third's use of the Truitt case: "As one member of the Supreme Court has
pointed out, good faith is not necessarily incompatible with stubbornness
or even with what to an outsider may seem unreasonableness." 126 The
two replied that "the [same] Justice also wrote: '.

.

. [good faith] is incon-

sistent with a predetermined resolve not to budge from an initial position.' ,27
The majority of the Board members in the GE case, and the majority of
the Justices in the Insurance Agents' and Truitt cases, seem to be skirting the
pre-bargaining TILI question by incorporating or relating this particular
technique within or to the overall conduct of the party, albeit somewhat hinting at or slightly mouthing a condemnation along per se lines. The reasons
are that the Truitt minority took a definite position against any per se approach by referring to the Board's view that "[t]he totality of the conduct of
the negotiation was apparently deemed irrelevant to the question; one fact
alone disposed of the case .

. .

."

The Truitt minority felt that "to make a

rule of law out of one item-even if a weighty item---of the evidence," is
"mechanical" jurisprudence not warranted under the Act. Therefore, "[s]ince
the Board applied the wrong standard here, by ruling that Truitt's failure to
supply financial information to the union constituted per se a refusal to
bargain in good faith, the case should be returned to the Board.' 128 These
minority strictures do not appear quite justified if the majority's language is
129
checked.
There does not seem to be any majority-minority disagreement in the
InsuranceAgents', Truitt, and GE cases as to the legal approach but, rather,
125. NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 487 (1960), quoted in
150 N.L.R.B. at 197.
126. 150 N.L.R.B. at 199, citing NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149, 154-55
(1956) (Frankfurter with Clark and Harlan concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Here the employer claimed financial inability to pay and refused, on demand by the
union, to produce evidence to substantiate this claim, upon which facts the Board found
a Section 8(a) (5) violation; which the Supreme Court upheld.
127. 150 N.L.R.B. at 197, quoting from NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149
(1956).
128. Id. at 155, 156, 157.
129. The Truitt majority felt that
in determining whether the obligation of good-faith bargaining has been met
the Board has a right to consider an employer's refusal to give information
about its financial status. . . . And it would certainly not be farfetched for a
trier of fact to reach the conclusion that bargaining lacks good faith when an
employer mechanically repeats a claim of inability to pay without making the
slightest effort to substantiate the claim. . . . We agree with the Board that
[such] a refusal . . . may support a finding of a failure to bargain in good
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as to its application and use.'13 And, if we return to the Insurance Agents'
case, we may note that situation was quite similar there.'1'
In other
words, the Justices apparently do not disagree on refusing to pin a per se
label on the TILI tactic, although accepting it as one fact in the total picture, but do disagree in their views of the factual substantiality of this total
picture for the purpose of finding a lack of good faith. The Board has
seemingly followed this inconclusive approach when applying the statutes
to the GE pre-bargaining TILI offer.
The Court of Appeals' Views
The Board's 1964 decision eventually came before the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit which, late in 1969 directed enforcement;
Judge Kaufman writing for himself and Judge Waterman (who also wrote a
short concurrence), and Judge Friendly concurring and dissenting. 132 TILI
becomes more and more curious, however, with the wonderland of Trial
Examiner-Labor Board-Second Circuit transformation becoming increasingly
more difficult to unravel. The specific TILI insurance plan offered by GE,
which the Trial Examiner had refused to find as a per se violation because of
faith. .

.

. We do not hold, however, that in every case in which economic

inability is raised . . . it automatically follows that the employees are entitled
to substantiating evidence. Each case must turn upon its particular facts. The
inquiry must always be whether or not under the [total?] circumstances of the
particularcase the statutory obligation to bargain in good faith has been met.
(Emphasis added.)
Id. at 152-54. On the present Supreme Court bench only two members of the Truitt
majority, Justices Black and Douglas, and one member of the minority, Justice Harlan,
remain.
130. The Truitt majority's language indicates that: (a) the mere claim of financial
inability is not a per se violation; (b) in some instances the employer must substantiate
this claim; so that (c) there are facts required other than the mere claim; which means
(d) that only from at least two or more facts the inference ("conclusion") may be
drawn of a state of mind, i.e., lack of good faith; so that (e) the minority's stringent
formulation against a per se violation is not rejected; with the conclusion therefore
flowing that (f) the majority feels the record of facts is sufficient, and the minority
feels it to be insufficient, to support the finding.
131. In this later case three Justices, Reed, Burton, and Minton, had been replaced
by Brennan, Whittaker, and Potter. The Truitt case had Frankfurter, Clark, and
Harlan joining in the minority, but in the Insurance Agents' case Clark joined the
majority, with Brennan and Potter joining, while Whittaker replaced Clark in the
Frankfurter and Harlan minority. The probable answer to why Clark defected would
be that in Truitt he felt the evidentiary facts to be insufficient and in Insurance Agents'
sufficient; although he might have changed his mind between the two decisions as to
a per se violation-rejected by this writer's analysis of the Insurance Agents' opinions
which disclose the majority not taking a hard and fast stand on this but following in
the general line of Truitt's substantial evidence approach.
132. NLRB v. General Elec. Co., 418 F.2d 736. The judges also discuss the free
speech contention under National Labor Relations Act § 8(c), 29 U.S.C. § 158(c)
(1964). Id. at 760-61. The "marketing" or publicity aspect of Boulwarism is, however, inextricably intertwined with free speech, and the lack of discussion by this
writer does not mitigate its importance.
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the General Counsel's repudiation, the Trial Examiner had used as one evidentiary fact to support the overall charge of bad faith. Thereafter the
Board nevertheless had ambiguously set it up as an independent holding without changing any finding of fact, simultaneously and additionally utilizing
TIL to support the overall bad faith charge. Now, in the Second Circuit by
Judge Kaufman not only used TILI as had the Board, but also to characterize the entirety of the GE approach. Boulwarism now became a second
type of TILL. Judge Kaufman used the term TILI specifically to condemn
the insurance plan offer, then generally in a second sense to characterize
the entirety of GE's Boulwarism and condemn this under the overall bad
faith charge. He also left TILI in a state of suspended animation, for the
question whether the TIL insurance plan offer per se and independently is
a violation of Section 8(a)(5) was never answered directly. Even on the
overall bad faith charge Judge Kaufman equivocated, adopted ambivalent
133
positions, and yet sought to save himself in his peroration.
The court majority discussed two unfair labor practices. One it denominated "Overall Failure to Bargain in Good Faith;" the other, "Specific Unfair Labor Practices," it divided into three parts, namely, the unilaterial insurance proposal, the refusal to furnish information, and the bargaining directly with the locals.13 4 As to the insurance item, the previous analyses
were not touched upon save most indirectly, and the court instead utilized
"the purpose of" Section 8(d), as here applied, to find against GE. That
purpose was that it "was designed to protect the status quo; it was to be
used as a shield, not as a sword."' 135 A "Specific Unfair Labor Practice"
occurred, continued the opinion, when the original insurance proposal publicized by GE, was objected to by the union and nevertheless was therafter
unilaterally placed by the company before its employees. The cutting effect
of this TILI offer within and without the union "seriously impaired" its
"ability to function as a bargaining representative . . . [and] such [GE]

conduct amounts to a declaration on the part of the Company [to all employees] that not only the Union, but the process of collective bargaining
133. See p. 339 infra.
134. Previously information and direct bargaining were used by the Examiner also
as "evidences," 150 N.L.R.B. at 193, and because they did not loom importantly in the
analyses herein, they have not been discussed to any extent. On the information item,
the Second Circuit majority held that "There can be no question that the information
available would have assisted the Union here; GE committed an unfair labor practice
in withholding it." 418 F.2d at 753. On the direct bargaining item the majority supported the Examiner-Board findings (except for one incident). Id. at 756. The third
judge agreed on these items as being violations, but rejected the finding on the TIL
insurance plan and also on the free speech and overall bargaining violations. Id. at
764-65.
135. Id. at 747, referring to, and throughout this portion of the opinion, relying on,
the Board's views in Equitable Life Ins. Co., 133 N.L.R.B. 1675 (1961).
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itself may be dispensed with."'18 6 This inference was not weakened by the
court's later statement that:
. Although the Trial Examiner found that GE did not attempt
to capitalize on the IUE's refusal to accept the personal accident
insurance proposal, this case is not distinguishable from Equitable.
The employer's attempt to use the Union's plight to its own advantage was not a determinative factor there. The dilemma
created by an employer exists whether he uses it crudely or subtly;
it is inherent in a take-it-or-leave-it bargaining approach. True, GE
did not capitalize on the Union's refusal; but through its enrollment
program late in June, and by the unavoidable controversy that the
issue itself raised in Union ranks, the Company was able to profit
from the situation without exploiting it outright. The rationale of
the Board's Equitable rule reaches at least that far. Once it is clear
that the party who disrupts the status quo cannot rely on section
8(d) to protect his conduct, 137 then unilateral action over a mandatory matter [the TILI plan], joined to a refusal to bargain [i.e.,
conduct other than the TILI plan], represents a straightforward
rejection of the collective bargaining principle in fact.' 3 8
In effect a new judicial rationale was now adopted and utilized but once
136. 418 F.2d at 748. The court's complete language is rather important:
[Tihere are serious objections to permitting one party to an agreement unilaterally to hold out this type of inducement to the other. It creates divisive tensions within the Union; employees with hazardous occupations will favor the
proposal, while those with routine tasks will object. Whichever way the Union
moves, it loses ground with some part of its constituency. Union democracy is
not furthered by permitting the Company to pick the Union apart piece by
piece. The same point may be made where there are both union and nonunion employees. If the Union refuses the benefit, then it may appear, at least
in the short run, to have disadvantaged its members vis-h-vis non-members.
Thus it may be forced to sacrifice long-term goals to avoid short-term dissatisfaction.
In the context of this case, where the Company's tactics seemed so
clearly designed to show the employees that the Union could win them nothing
more than the Company was prepared to offer, it is even more apparent that
a unilateral offer--over which the Union may not bargain--diminishes the rewards and the importance of the bargaining at the end of the contract period.
Thus the Union's ability to function as a bargaining representative is seriously
impaired. Indeed, such conduct amounts to a declaration on the part of the
Company that not only the Union, but the process of collective bargaining
itself may be dispensed with.
Id. at 747-48. Judge Friendly disagreed with the time-lumping of the TILI proposal
(see his formulation in text p. - supra), and desired to uphold the initial offer as "GE
merely submitted a proposal and did this at a time when it had no duty to bargain at
all." Id. at 766. He further pointed out that "the contract expressly permits" this.
"The majority attempts to escalate the problems by suggesting that the course here
followed would create 'divisive tendencies within the Union,' and even enable the 'Company to pick the Union apart piece by piece.'. . . These comments, unsupported by
the record, are singularly inappropriate as applied to the [TILI] offer ....
Id.
137. For the type of violation involved, see note 148 infra.
138. 418 F.2d at 749. On the mandatory aspect the court earlier had stated "that
insurance is a mandatory subject for collective bargaining, and the employer violates
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again resulted in ambivalent determinations. One important question of fact
immediately intruded, namely, at what point in time was the TILI insurance
plan involved? Judge Kaufman's facts mentioned its publicity by GE prior
to June 13th (enrollment to occur in July), with the union's strenuous ob13 9
Judge Friendly emjection to the company's failure to bargain on it.
phasized that the proposal was submitted by GE "at a time when it had no
duty to bargain at all."' 1 40 Both therefore discussed the pre-bargaining situation-or, at least, so it would appear. Judge Kaufman also used the phrase,
"totality of circumstances," for which Judge Friendly expressed a "distaste."'141 Next Judge Kaufman examined the overall violation as 1ap42
plied to "GE's bargaining stance and conduct, considered as a whole,"'
i.e., Boulwarism. He felt that even the pre-bargaining TILI proposal could
enter as evidence to show how and why the company violated the Act,
e.g., the devastating and vicious outcome for the Union when the consequences inherent in the details of Boulwarism are followed through to their
end. It is at this point that Judge Kaufman judicially adopted the Trial
Examiner and Board's approach to formulate a judicial rationale, here applied within "the context of this case . . . . 14 But this overall concept,
while using the term "take-it-or-leave-it," was not limited to the TILT insurance plan and, used in a second and different sense, was expanded to cover
the entirety of Boulwarism. Later, in discussing GE's overall conduct, the
Judge reiterated these views, decried by Judge Friendly, to substantiate this
144
general bad faith violation.
section 8(a)(5) . . . by refusing to bargain over it....

He would, of course, also

violate the Act if he unilaterally changed the conditions or terms of employment." Id.
at 746. However, neither of these, as violations, was further discussed as such or was
held to have occurred.
139. Id. Judge Kaufman's statement of facts at 742 is similar.
140. Id. at 766.
141. Id. at 756, 767, the term "distaste" was used by Judge Kaufman. However, by
using "substantial evidence," Judge Friendly nevertheless aligned himself factually and
legally with the majority.
142. Id. at 756.
143. Id. at 748.
144. Id. at 756-60. The two Judges also quibbled about the meaning and application of Judge Magruder's opinion in NLRB v. Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., 205 F.2d 131
(1st Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 887 (1953). Judge Friendly stated that "The only
standard of conduct set for GE by the Board's opinion is that a mix of the 'fair, firm
offer' technique pursued to an unknown point X, plus a communications program pursued to an equally unknown point Y, plus a number of additional items, Z, Z2 , and Z.,
is proscribed. This already sufficient confusion is now compounded by the difference
in my brothers' efforts at elucidation." 418 F.2d at 773. To which Judge Kaufman
replied that
Judge Magruder did not suggest that "desire not to reach an agreement" could
be found, as the dissent suggests, by a clearly delineated series of steps, X, X2 ,
X3 , taken to "point Y, plus a number of additional items, Z 1, Z2, Z3 ." Far
from being a devotee of the new math, he would have agreed with Learned
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It is this Trial Examiner-Labor Board-Second Circuit rationale which permeates the entirety of their opinions and which sets the tone for their several
holdings. But this creates problems of understanding, and Judge Friendly's
objections are not inapropos, i.e., "[a]lthough both the Board and the
majority here have been quite explicit in describing what they are not deciding, 1 45 they are far less informative with respect to what they are ...
While the lead opinion makes much use of the 'take-it-or-leave-it' phrase, it
never defines this."'1 46 Thus, was the original TIL insurance offer qua
pre-bargaining tactic an independent violation per se? Judge Kaufman did
not say yes or no. He first said that the GE unilateral offer and effectuating
of a mandatory bargaining item was reprehensible in impaling the union on
the horns of a dilemma from which it could not escape, and that this result
was inherent in such TILI approach. He did not positively and clearly
hold this to be a per se violation. Although absolving GE of any attempt to
capitalize on the union's refusal, Kaufman felt that through the unavoidable
consequences within and to the union, GE "was able to profit from the situation without exploiting it outright.' 1 47 He then took these Ossa-upon-Pelion
inferences and held that, "joined to a refusal to bargain, [this] represents a
straightforward rejection of the collective bargaining principle in fact." Why
the joined "refusal to bargain," without more, was not sufficient for that conclusion was not discussed; why the TILI inherent dilemma was not likewise sufficient was also not discussed. Apparently both were required in
order to find "a straightforward rejection . . . in fact"-which doesn't make
sense. If a violation occurred without the TILI aspect, then such addition
makes the violation more egregious but not more violative unless, and here
is the nub, the words "in fact" imply that without the joining the separate
violations would have had to be held to be per se ones or a combined legal
conclusion, which the court did not care to do. In other words, the legal
sorites created by the court was built upon implications and inferences, then
its conclusion added to another one, all within the framework of its rationale,
and which supposedly resulted in a violation "in fact" despite the dis48
claimers concerning other facts.'
Hand that numbers, even more than words, "are utterly inadequate to deal
with the fantastically multiform occasions which come up in human life."

Id. at 761.
145. See id. at 762. See also text at note 167 infra.
146. 418 F.2d at 768.
147. Id. at 749.
148. On the basis of the opinion a contrary conclusion may also be urged, namely,
that the majority did hold the TIL tactic per se bad. Support for this view may also
come from Judge Kaufman's discussion of the bargaining charge. Inter alia he wrote,
referring to Medo Photo Supply Corp. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 678 (1944), that
[tihe vice that Medo sought to avoid was the practice of undermining the authority of the union's bargaining representatives through direct dealings with
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The majority opinion by Judge Kaufman later turned to GE's alleged
overall failure to bargain in good faith, and while his treatment of this
problem was initially ambiguous, he did somewhat clarify his rulings as he
went along. The alleged failure to bargain, he said, was "the most troublesome and most vigorously contested of the charges;" it was "in addition to
the three specific unfair labor practices . . . [and was] compounded
like a mosaic of many pieces, but depending not on any one alone. They are
together 14 9 to be understood to comprise the 'totality of the circumstances.' "150 While certain employer conduct, continued Judge Kaufman,
could be per se violations, and so no overall (totality) violation need therefore have been found, the Board nevertheless had "chose[n] to find" both.
And it also had found that the "bargaining stance and conduct [of GE], considered as a whole, were designed to derogate the Union in the eyes of its
members and the public at large. This plan had two major facets: first, a
take-it-or-leave-it approach ('firm, fair offer') to negotiations in general...
and second, a communications program." 15 1
The majority therefore now utilizes the full term of "take-it-or-leave-it"
the locals or employees they represented. Such tactics are inherently divisive;
they make negotiations difficult and uncertain; they subvert the cooperation
necessary to sustain a responsible and meaningful union leadership. The evil,
then, is not in offering more. It is in the offer itself.
418 F.2d at 755.
This rationale jibes with that used in the discussion of the TILI plan, and consistency here may therefore permit the contention that "The evil, then, . . . is in the offer
itself," applies likewise to TIL. However, Medo's majority opinion by Chief Justice
Stone (Black and Douglas were then on the bench also) was careful in stating that the
charge of "ignoring the union . ..by negotiating with its [the employer's] employees
concerning wages . . . and by inducing its employees to abandon the union ...
violated § 8(l) [today's § 8(a)(1)] of the Act." 321 U.S. at 684. "Quite apart
from" this violation, it was also a like Section 8(a)(1) violation "to induct them
[the employees] by the grant of wage increases, to leave the union." Id. at 685.
Section 8(a)(5) did not apply or, at least, was not mentioned or specifically held to
apply. Additionally, however, the Chief Justice refused to permit the employer to
disestablish the ifnion through such unfair labor practice and then refuse to bargain
with it as the employees' representative, as this was "an aggravation of its unfair labor
practice in destroying the majority's support of the union, and it was a violation of
§§ 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act." Id. at 687.
149. Does this term mean that the three specific unfair acts are to be joined to and
with the mosaic of many other pieces, or does the term refer only to the pieces of the
mosaic? From what follows it would appear that the former is meant.
150. 418 F.2d at 756, citing the Insurance Agents' and Truitt cases, discussed above,
with Judge Kaufman stating Judge Friendly was not receptive to the "totality of circumstances" phrase. However, Friendly had "no difficulty with the Board's making a
finding of bad faith based on an entire course of conduct so long as the standard of bad
faith is, in Judge Magruder's well-known phrase, a 'desire not to reach an agreement
with the Union,'" citing NLRB v. Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., 205 F.2d 131, 134 (1st Cir.
1953). This Judge Friendly felt to be a definite standard. 418 F.2d at 767.
151. 418 F.2d at 756. In both facets, said the court, the union's "powerlessness and
uselessness . . . to its members" were pictured, and GE was portrayed "as the true defender of the employees' interests, further denigrating the Union, and sharply curbing
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to refer to first, the insurance plan alone, and second, to the overall preparation, research, etc. by GE which culminated in its "firm, fair offer" and which
it now publicized,-Boulwarism. The quoted language and the preceding
bifurcation do not, however, completely square with all that has preceded.
E.g., the TILI tactic and language as such had been limited throughout to the
insurance plan whereas now it was applied to "negotiations in general," the
"firm, fair offer" approach had nevertheless been factually breached and
several minor concessions made. 15 2 Nevertheless, Judge Kaufman was correct innext stating that the Board had relied on the three specific practices
and on several other specific instances to show the overall (totality) bad faith
violation, now instancing the TILI insurance plan as an example. 153 But
while the Judge may then have erred slightly in replying to one of GE's
arguments,' 5 4 he recovered sufficiently to point out that TILI's legality
nevertheless permitted its use as "some evidence of lack of good faith;"' 55
so that, in conjunction with, e.g., the refusal to furnish information, its total
"conduct . . .was all of a piece."' 156
It is at this point that the opinion beings to detail the general, overall,
"totality of circumstances" conduct of GE, even though conclusory terms
the Company's ability to change its own position." Id. See also notes 158 and 164
infra.
Judge Waterman termed this communications program GE's "dominant wrong." 418
F.2d at 764. He also stated that "to some extent" the evils resulting from "a firm fair
offer" doubtless exist, "even when there is no company publicity of the kind here
involved. However, it seems clear that publicity tends to amplify these undesirable tendencies to the point that, in a case such as this one, the amplification can well be construed to have been activated by a company motive not to bargain in good faith." Id.
152. These were discounted, however, by the majority, see note 157 in!ra.
153. 418 F.2d at 756.
154. GE argued that Equitable Life Ins. Co., 133 N.L.R.B. 1675 (1961) had not
been decided in 1960 and therefore its acts could not be characterized in the light of
this decision. The court responded "that the conduct, although not yet proscribed, had
not been judged proper either. . . . In any event, parties who make a practice of
stretching the statutory fabric to a breaking point should not be surprised when the
cloth gives way." 418 F.2d at 749.
155. Id. at 757. But then why did he continue:
Given the effects of take-it-or-leave-it proposals on the Union, already set forth
in our review of the specific unfair labor practice charges, the Board could
appropriately infer the presence of anti-Union animus, and in conjunction
with other similar conduct could reasonably discern a pattern of illegal activity designed primarily to subvert the Union. (Emphasis added).
Id. Confusion is heightened when one goes into the above language. First, the "effects"
involved factual consequences, which makes it impossible for a TILI offer to be
viewed in isolation or on a per se basis. Second, "proposals" brings up a non-per se
situation, so that a context, or totality of circumstances, results. Third, Judge Kaufman's previous analysis of the "specific" TILI plan was on a per se basis. Fourth,
"appropriately infer" here must refer to more than one act, and yet "in conjunction"
with the inference from this grouping must imply that such grouping alone could not
support a bad faith ending.
156. Id.
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are used, to disclose why it was upholding the bad faith charge and finding. 15 7 The publicity campaign was also excoriated because it not only
affected the union adversely and detrimentally, threatening its very existence, but "[t]he most telling effect . . . [was] on GE itself."

It had boxed

itself in because "its communications approach determined its take-it-orleave-it [overall] bargaining strategy [i.e., Boulwarism]. Each was the
natural complement of the other; if either were substantially changed, the
other would in all probability have to be modified as well."' 158 The majority's
philosophy now emerges. The court, the Board and the Examiner all adopt
and use a similar, if not identical, approach to Boulwarism. Their outlook
appears to be compounded of a pragmatic-realism with a dash of soft determinism, 159 holding GE to a standard of labor conduct envisaged as comporting with congressional and judicial views, and emphasizing the company's
ability to change to these concepts. 160 This is disclosed in two steps.
The majority's first step is to quote that the congressional purpose of encouraging productive bargaining requires the parties to make "'a serious
attempt to resolve differences and reach a common ground,' an effort inconsistent with a 'predetermined resolve not to budge from an initial position.' "1611 Then it characterizes these as "not simple tests; they will not be re157. "GE displayed a patronizing attitude towards Union negotiators inconsistent
with a genuine desire to reach a mutually satisfactory accord." Its responses to "detailed proposals were vague and uninformative" and it offered lectures instead. It
refused to estimate the total package it would consider reasonable although it had
publicized its proposal. It "occasionally took untenable and unreasonable positions and
then defended them, with no apparent purpose other than to avoid yielding." The
"most flagrant example occurred in setting the date for the beginning of pension and
insurance benefits . . . GE vacillated back and forth, chose inconsistent and confusing
explanations at random .... ." Much more is related, including the period after "it
had become apparent that the Union would have to end its abortive strike and concede
to GE's terms ......
The contention that GE made so many concessions that the
charges could not be said to have been proven was rejected because "[oin close examination, however, few of the alleged concessions turn out to have a great deal of substance."
Id. at 757-58.
158. Id. at 759. "The Company, having created a view of the bargaining process
that admitted of no compromise, was trapped by its own creation. It could no longer
seek peace without total victory, for it had by its own words and actions branded any
compromise a defeat." Id. at 760. And later the court wrote, "By its communications
and bargaining strategy it in effect painted itself into a corner on all bargainable matters." Id. at 762.
159. Judge Kaufman wrote, of Judge Magruder's opinion in Reed & Prince that Magruder "was careful in his opinion not to be misled, as our dissenting brother appears to
be, by words that seem on the surface quite simple but in practice require a highly
pragmatic and individualized interpretation." Id. at 761.
160. Judge Friendly thought this difficult, if not impossible, because of ambiguities
and confusion in the orders and opinions. Id. at 768, 773-74.
161. Id. at 762, first quoting from the Insurance Agents' case then from the Truitt
case (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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solved by formular incantations."'"0 2 The difficulty "arises out of the
herculean task of legislating a statement of mind," and it is compounded
by the analogous one of adjudicating it; the Board so did, however,
and, "on the basis of substantial evidence we agree." Judge Kaufman's
second step is expressed in these words: "A pattern of conduct by which one
party makes it virtually impossible for him to respond to the other-knowing
that he is doing so deliberately-should be condemned by the same rationale that prohibits 'going through the motions' with a 'predetermined resolve not to budge from an initial position.' ,,163
These two steps illustrate the premises, reasoning, and approach of, and
the conclusions reached by, the majority. The premises are the congressional
intent as interpreted (by the quotations); the reasoning involves the substantial evidence rule, not really any per se basis; the approach is to seek for a
"totality of circumstances" or facts, or a "pattern of conduct," which emanates from the (substantial) evidence; and the conclusions include GE's
self-boxing or painting of itself into a comer, via publicity,' 64 "on all bargainable matters," i.e., the general TILI approach to and conduct of bargaining which is contradictory of the above premises and interpretation. The
court's overall view results in the following:
We hold that an employer may not so combine "take-it-or-leaveit" bargaining methods with a widely publicized stance of unbending firmness that he is himself unable to alter a position once
taken. It is this specific conduct that GE must avoid in order to
comply with the Board's order, and not a carbon copy of every
underlying event relied upon by the Board to support its findings.
Such conduct, we find, constitutes a refusal to bargain "in fact."
. . . It also constitutes, as the facts of this action demonstrate,
an absence of subjective good faith, for it implies that the Company
can deliberately bargain and communicate as though the Union
did not exist, in clear derogation of the Union's status as exclusive
representative of its members under section 9(a).1 65
In other words, the majority states that the overall TILI conduct, plus the
162. "Sadly, neither will they be. so precise that one will always know the exact
limits of what is allowed, and what forbidden-but this is a problem hardly unknown in
the law or to judges." Id.
163. Id.
164. Judge Waterman felt that while GE could insist on its original offer as the
best (see note 169, infra), and certain of its other described conduct "do not indicate
anything except that GE made and stood by what it conceived to be a fair, firm offer,"
still, "[w]hat makes these practices unfair is GE's 'widely publicized stance of unbending firmness,' . . . [as tiwo distinct evils derive from such publicity." 418 F.2d
at 764. The first evil was to make GE "seal itself" and the second "that the union is
superfluous."
165. id. at 762-63. Judge Friendly nevertheless felt no combination of specific conduct rejection and specific compliance requirement could be found, and therefore the
order and opinions were ambiguous and confusing.
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publicity, equals an inability to bargain "in fact" and therefore is, as such,
a general and overall violation of Section 8(a)(5). Further, from this
factual violation an inference of a subjective lack of good faith flows,' 66
although no express holding is made that another violation of the section additionally occurs. If these statements are correctly put, then the original
and specific pre-bargaining TILI plan is not being definitively held to be a
per se violation, despite Judge Kaufman's general language, save that insofar as it is included within a context it partakes of the overall violation.
This seems to be reaffirmed negatively, as in the following quotation by
which Judge Kaufman attempts to be careful as to "any misunderstanding of
our holding.

.

." and therefore rejects three of them:

We do not today hold that an employer may not communicate with
his employees during negotiations. Nor are we deciding that the
"best offer first" bargaining technique is forbidden. Moreover, we
do not require an employer to engage in "auction bargaining," or,
as the dissent seems to6 7suggest, compel him to make concessions,
"minor" or otherwise.'
The differences in this negative language may be significant. On the
first item Judge Kaufman does not "hold;" as to the second, he is not "deciding;" and as to the third, he does not "require" or "compel." The second
is analogous to, if not, the specific and original TILI technique or tactic on
the insurance plan, and Judge Kaufman is not "deciding" that it is per se
forbidden, probably because of the Insurance Agents' caveat; 6 8 but does
not the first clause of the third sentence, i.e., not requiring auction bargaining,
suggest the decision? For if an offer is the "best" one can make, by definition it precludes any other although the coin-face also remains, that trading
one "best" for another's "best," or any such type of conduct, still remains
feasible.' 6 9 Although one may question that if this negative language and
this writer's reasoning give this conclusion, why does Judge Friendly argue
as he does? 170 Separately, the second time-aspect of TILI i.e., during the
bargaining stage, may likewise be concluded not to have been definitively
held a per se violation because it was disclaimed as such by the Trial Ex166. E.g., thereby derogating from the union's exclusive representation rights under National Labor Relations Act § 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1964).
167. 418 F.2d at 762. The first has to do with free speech and Section 8(c). See
note 131 supra. The third's second disjunctive is conceded; it is the first clause which
is here referred to. See also note 198 infra.
168. See text at note 104 supra.
169. So that on this coin-face aspect the first clause of the third sentence may not
so bolster the decision implied above. Judge Waterman, concurring, also held that "a
company is entitled to insist on the terms of its original offer if it believes that the
union can be made to accept that offer." 418 F.2d at 764. But see note 164 supra.
170. See note 136 supra.

Boulwarism

19701

aminer; the Board never overruled this finding, and the Court did not discuss
this as a separate item.
However, the second face of TILI, i.e., the use of the phrase by Judge
Kaufman to characterize the entirety of GE's technique, position, practice,
and offer, and thereby to condemn such total conduct as an overall violation,
must be factually sustainable in particular and in general. This is Judge
Friendly's major quarrel with the majority. For, as already discussed, this
second TILI face implies that the total GE offer was factually put on a
take-it-or-leave-it basis (in conjunction with the GE communications program). 1 ' This, however, the Trial Examiner and Labor Board opinions disclosed was not so, and Judge Friendly also pointed this out. 1 72 Judge
Friendly therefore did two things, first, questioned Judge Kaufman's factual
basis, i.e., did GE actually place itself in such a TILI position, and secondly, rejected the contention that GE's communications program was violative of the Act.' 7 3 He therefore defined the term as he saw it, 174 later feeling
that we must "rid ourselves of the prejudice inevitably engendered by this
catch-phrase,"' 175 and then, as to the first above aspect, commented:
To go further and say that a party, whether employer or union,
who, after listening to and considering such proposals, violates
§8(a)(5) if he rejects them because of confidence in his own
bargaining power, would ignore the explicit command of §8(d)
... . Although the taking of such a hard position may be
unattractive, the attitude is one which the law allows an employer
or a union to take . . . [so] that an employer is not to be con-

demned for "take-it-or-leave-it" bargaining when, after discussing
the union's proposals and supporting arguments, he formulates
what he considers a sufficiently attractive offer and refuses to alter
it unless convinced an alteration is "right.' 76
Judge Friendly also rejected the self-boxing view of the majority that GE
171. 418 F.2d at 756.
172. Id. at 769. "Moreover, I find no substantial evidence that GE got itself into
the predicament the majority depicts. The best evidence to the contrary consists of
the changes the Company in fact made." Id. He spent the balance of the paragraph
giving illustrations, and then commented: "The union's appraisals of the value of these
concessions at the time is . . . impressive . . . . I find nothing on the other side
substantial enough to outweigh this evidence that GE remained able to adopt changes it
thought to be 'right.'" Id. at 770. He commented that "we could not uphold it

[the Board's order] on that basis [that single offer bargaining is a violation] even if
the evidence supported [such] a finding . . ., which it does not . . . . The lead
opinion rightly does not do this, and the concurring opinion expressly disclaims any

such view."

id. at 773 n.9.

However, the two other opinions combined this with the

communications-boxing aspect to hold the result was a violation.

173. As already seen, the combination was required by Judge Kaufman (and the
Board) in order to make up the general violation.
174. See note 25 supra.
175. 418 F.2d at 769.

176. Id. at 768-69.
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painted itself into a comer by its publicizing of its firm, fair offer and consequently could not retreat without losing face, regardless of the requirements
of good faith bargaining. He inquired whether a union (or employer), obtaining a favorable contract from one employer (or with one union) and
broadcasting it would take no less from (or give more to) others, thereby
violated the Act. Factually, he found "no substantial evidence that GE
got itself into the predicament the majority depicts. The best evidence to the
contrary consists of the changes the Company in fact made."' 177 As to the
second above aspect, that is, the communications program, he felt that Section 8(c), the so-called free speech section of the Act, covered the publicity
and other details, which were not so egregiously promulgated, and therefore no general bargaining violation could be predicated upon it alone or
17
in combination.
Aside from his preceding objections, Judge Friendly also inveighed against
the details of what he felt to be a generally obscure and unenforceable
order, especially as rendered basically time-innocuous. 79 On this last he
pointed to the "two further negotiations, in 1963 and 1966 . . .[and that]
now in progress," and felt that "many of the principles in the 1960 negotiations are no longer on the scene and it is scarcely possible that the company's
actions are so nearly parallel to those of 1960 . . . .-180 In this last the
Judge was correct, for the 1969-70 bargaining, with the contract expiring, as
had the others, on October 26th, disclosed the following: The first GE offer
was made on October 7, 1969, although the negotiations had begun two
177. Id. at 769, then giving the various changes at length and commenting that
"The Union's appraisals of the value of these concessions at the time is more impressive
than the depreciation of them nine years after the event." Id. at 770. He felt that
"nothing on the other side [is] substantial enough to outweigh this evidence that GE
remained able to adopt changes it thought to be 'right.'" Id.
178. Id. at 772-73, feeling that GE's publicized "policy not to give more simply to
avert a strike" was not a Section 8(a)(5) violation, and later feeling that "Congress,
when it enacted § 8(c), determined the dangers that free expression might entail for
successful bargaining were a lesser risk than to have the Board police employer or
union speech." Id.
179. Judge Friendly was here taking an overall view of the picture he found presented, but this ignored the Examiner's (and Board adopted, and now Court enforced) report requiring affirmative action by GE, namely, that GE offer reinstatement to employees and make whole others for any loss of pay suffered due to
GE's discrimination, 150 N.L.R.B. at 286. Without a finding of some unfair labor
practice suitable for these purposes of affirmatively so ordering, this branch of the order might have had to fall, e.g., Judge Friendly was willing to grant enforcement of
the order as to the required decretal paragraphs involving information and preventing
GE from bargaining directly with the locals. Quaere: would these support a reinstatement order and back-pay award? See M. FORKOScH, LABOR LAW §§ 517, 522-23 (2d
ed. 1965).
180. He was referring to a court order in the 1969-70 negotiations, found in General Elec. Co. v. NLRB, 412 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1969). He continued "that an order in
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months earlier, and this offer was "emphasized" by the GE officials as "a
'whole offer' with nothing held back for later concessions."'' s1 A nationwide
strike occurred, 8 2 with the union filing charges with the Labor Board and
claiming that the company's conduct was now the same as in 1960.188
GE kept its plants open, both sides engaged in large-scale publicizing, advertising, and communications, and a national 84 boycott against GE products
was initiated. 8 5 By the seventh week of the strike both sides exchanged
further offers. GE offered specific wage increases in the three-year contract it had proposed instead of wage-reopening clauses in the second and
third, and instead of a 30-month contract the union offered a 16-month
one. 1 6 The (eventually successful) federal mediators stepped in,'8 7 and by
the thirteenth week an unidentified source reported that GE had "indicated a
willingness to make a further adjustment in its last economic proposal. But
union officials were said to be pressing for other concessions in such areas
88
as union security, arbitration and pensions.'1
The fourteenth week of the strike found additional offers and counterthis case, even had it been made earlier, would have supported a contempt proceeding."
418 F.2d at 774.
181. N.Y. Times, Oct. 14, 1969, at 14, col. 1.
182. About 150,000 employees struck, with GE attempting to continue production
by manning its plants with the other employees and its supervisory personnel.
183. N.Y. Times, Nov. 4, 1969, at 26, cot. 3.
184. This was the first initiated by the AFL in nearly three-quarters of a century.
185. In support of the boycott students, for example, staged rallies, and court injunctions against certain violent conduct were obtained, N.Y. Times, Nov. 25, 1969, at 22,
cot. 4; Dec. 13, 1969, at 21, col. 3; Jan. 28, 1970, at 41, cot. 4. "Citizens to Aid GE
Strikers" solicited funds. Id. Jan. 9, 1970, at 10, cot. 7; GE complained, and thereafter
the N.Y. Times inveighed against, "The preparation by the United Federation of
Teachers of a detailed 'teaching unit' of four lessons on the General Electric strike for
Jan. 12, 1970, at 34, cot. 2, with the City school system reminding the teachers that
such a subject "should be treated in a scholarly and objective manner." Id. Jan. 21,
1970, at 38, col. 4. The President of the United Federation of Teachers (of New York
City) responding that no indoctrination had been attempted; the sources included
GE advertisements, and the lesson plan was a balanced one. Id. Jan. 26, 1970, at 46,
col. 6. In the post-settlement fortnight unidentified bombings and threats of bombing of GE buildings occurred. Id. Feb. 9, 1970, at 30, cot. 3; Feb. 10, 1970, at 16,
cot. 4.
The economic consequences of the strike for GE, which included the effects of the
boycott, were disclosed by an 85 percent drop in its earnings for the last quarter of
1969, reducing the full-year profit 22 percent from the 1968 level; the first quarter
of 1970 was also unprofitable. id. Feb. 20, 1970, at 59, cot. 2.
186. Id. Dec. 8, 1969, at 50, col. 3. The labor editor of the N.Y. Times called this a
GE "revised offer [which nevertheless] remains far short of adequacy by union standards ...... Id. Dec. 22, 1969, at 32, cot. 5.
187. By about the twelfth week the mayors of 34 cities where GE plants were involved met with both sides, but without success, one mayor accusing both sides and
terming the strike "a holy war." U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Jan. 26, 1970, at 82.
188. Stetson, A Break is Hinted in G.E. Talks. N.Y. Times, Jan. 27, 1970, at
45, col. 1. This issue also contained a story by a by-lined writer which disclosed, inter
alia, that in New York the strikers were collecting, beginning with the eighth week, un-
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offers sweetening the pot, e.g., the union agreed to a 40-month contract' 8 9
with GE upping its fringe benefits. The mediating efforts resulted in:
Success by the union in breaching the overall concept of Boulwarism,
i.e., the initial GE emphasized "whole offer," with nothing held back for
later horse-trading, had been bettered significantly in several respects.' 9 0
Both sides had engaged in very "hard bargaining," but in bargaining nevertheless, regardless of initial language and positions, so that adjusting, compromising, and reconciling had occurred. Both sides had also indulged in
mass communicating, advertising, 19 ' and other forms of publicity directed to
the public and the employees.
The general details found in the 1960 concept of Boulwarism, e.g., Company research and preparation of positions throughout the year, listening to
Union proposals and making "right" adjustments, placing a proposal on the
table, continually publicizing all of this, and then maintaining a sticky position on such offer, was still an overall feature which undoubtedly could be
continued provided "sticky" was not translated into "unyielding" or "unbending" and there was a factually significant modification in and of the
initial offer. Boulwarism's new style of factually unyielding bargaining,
even though GE still felt its first and best and only offer was completely
fair to all parties and employees and the result of objective research and
subjective considerations, changed to a new albeit hard "traditional" type of
give-and-take bargaining. GE will, while continuing all other aspects of
Boulwarism but regardless of what should be the first offer, now have it
purposely deflated, so as to meet inflated union demands, and so arrive
with the union at a position between the two. This obviously means that the
key feature or end result of procedural Boulwarism has capitulated. TILI
in its general and overall aspects, as condemned by Judge Kaufman, has been
laid to rest.
Questions remain concerning a specific and particular TILI proposal, e.g.,
the insurance plan discussed above in both its pre-bargaining and its bargaining, time aspects. This writer's opinion is that such particular TILI,
in a context free of or at least not necessarily tied to and with the
employment compensation checks with a maximum of $65.00 per week.
189. The other GE unions fell in line with the new agreement except for the International Ass'n of Machinists (IAM), while there were also strong negative votes
within the major unions; by February 15th, the 113th day of the strike, the IAM's last
local ratified. Id. Feb. 16, 1970, at 11, col. 1.
190. E.g., cash increases of at least $0.53 per hour, a cost-of-living clause up to
$0.21 an hour, extras for skilled workers of between $0.05 to $0.25 per hour, GE's
taking over of health insurance premiums (about $0.03 per hour), and about $0.24 per
hour more for other fringes, or a total average package of $1.05 per hour or 7.5 percent
a year.
191. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Dec. 2, 1969, at 45; Dec. 5, 1969, at 29; Dec. 21, 1969,
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hard-and-fast determined second face of TILI now laid to rest, will
not necessarily and on a per se basis be denounced, but that the burden of
proof to disclose such a per se violation will perhaps rest upon the (Union)
General Counsel. Further, even such a limited use of TILI is not to become
standardized throughout industry, nor is the New Boulwarism to become a
pattern for bargaining, because in both situations the factual and objective
background of research and publicity, 192 as well as the subjective willingness
and financial ability of the company to take a strike if its hard bargaining
fails, are necessary and determining features which must be present. 193 Today, in the light of Old Boulwarism's capitulation, so that its general and
1 4
overall TILI approach to and the bargaining itself (i.e., its second face)'
has been supplanted by the New Boulwarism, GE's overall and modified
(TILI) approach may come within the "economic pressure tactics" seemingly, but not quite, upheld in the Insurance Agents' case which refused to
permit the Labor Board to control substantively.' 9 5 Nevertheless, will the
New Boulwarism now be held to be without the condemnation of the some§ E, at 7; Jan. 6, 1970, at 21; Jan. 13, 1970, at 30; Jan. 15, 1970, at 33; and a post
settlement story on Feb. 9, 1970, at 23.
192. See, e.g., pp. 313-15 supra.
193. The additional observation may be made that where large-scale employers or
unions are found, or industry-wide bargaining is engaged in, there may well be judicially
required and applied in some manner (e.g., by injunctions) concepts found expressed
by the Court in Detroit & T.S.L. R.R. v. United Transp. Union, 396 U.S. 142 (1969),
even though there involved were the provisions of the Railway Labor Act of 1926, ch.
347, 44 Stat. 577, 45 U.S.C. § 151-88 (1964).
194. On pertinent language here see text and notes 23, 127 supra. The IUE has
suggested that Boulwarism is today dead, but the IUE does not make the distinction
here drawn between the "old" and the "new."
195. See text and notes 101-10, 115 supra. On the publicity in general see note
19 supra.
The courts and the Board have almost uniformly adhered to the generality expressed
in Section 8(d), that the obligation to bargain in good faith "does not compel either
party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession." See, e.g., NLRB
v. Insurance Agents' Int'l, 361 U.S. 477, 485-87 (1960); M. FoRuoscH LABOR LAW
§ 432 (2d ed. 1965). See also Forkosch, Comment on "The Myth of 'Free' Collective
Bargaining", SYMPOSIUM ON LABOR RELATIONS LAW 244-49 (R. Slovenko ed. 1961).
However, Section 10(c) authorizes the Board to order a violating party "to take such
affirmative action .. . as will effectuate the policies of this Act. . . ." Under this
power the Board's remedial orders have been rather broad, albeit subject to judicial
review, and have included, e.g., directions to resume a discontinued operation. M.
FoROScH, LABOR LAW §§ 820-21 (2d ed. 1965). However, in United Steelworkers
v. NLRB, 363 F.2d 272, 276 (D.C. Cir.) cert. denied, 385 U.S. 851 (1966) the court
faced a situation where the company "had no reason, other than to frustrate the bargaining procedure, to refuse to accept the dues checkoff." A specific order to it at that
time so to agree was not necessary; seven months later the court clarified its earlier
views and remanded to the Board, saying inter alia, that Section 8(d)'s language did
not prohibit the Board from ordering a flouting company "to make meaningful and
reasonable counteroffers, or indeed even to make a concession. . . ." Thus the Board
could order the granting of a checkoff "in return for a reasonable concession by the
union on wages or insurance-the two issues besides checkoff that remained in dispute
.. . [or even] in an appropriate case . . . simply order the company to grant a check-
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what strong language used by Judge Kaufman.19 6 On the new facts' 97
and on the Judge's negativing language 19 8 as well as Judge Friendly's pertinent and now-applicable views,' 9 9 apparently this question should be answered affirmatively but, depending on a different or new rationale, may be
20 0
answered negatively.

off."

United Steel Workers v. NLRB, 389 F.2d 295, 299-300 (D.C. Cir. 1967).

The

majority then discussed the freedom of contracts concepts implicit in Section 10(d) and

concluded that the checkoff here "is at most a minor intrusion on freedom of contract."
Id. at 302. Thereafter the Board's supplemental decision and order directed the company to grant a checkoff, without further ado, which the court of appeals enforced.
On certiorari the Supreme Court reversed and held against the Board, sub nom.
H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 90 S. Ct. 821 (1970).
196. See text at note 165 supra.
197. I.e., the new methods do not result in an "unbending firmness" or TILI overall
bargaining.
198. See text accompanying and following note 167 supra. It may be observed that
all opinions analyzed, and especially the majority ones, have a propensity to specificity
in what they are not deciding but an imprecision in what they are deciding.
199. If not previously applicable, on which see text accompanying and following
note 172 supra.
200. A friend in a responsible position with the NLRB, after reading this article
has commented:
One of the difficulties in this labor relations area, as in many others, suggests
the Holmesian posture about experience, rather than logic, shaping the law.
I am increasingly of the view that complex problems in labor relations and in
other areas of socio-economic relationships are not necessarily reducible to
precise logical components and that such a reduction even if achieved dictates
obvious and correct answers. Perhaps-I do not feel ready to accept the
premise, Borg-Warner [NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S.
342 (1958)] was incorrectly decided. Perhaps "good faith" in a contest of
economic muscle is a weak crutch for resolution of economic disputes.

